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PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This letter-brief is submitted pursuant to Executive Law Section 259-i(4), and 9
New York Code of Rules and Regulations Part 8006, in support of the administrative
appeal of the New York State Parole Board's determination of November 28, 2018, in

which parole was denied to
Correctional Facility)

(Green Haven

|. A Notice of Appeal was filed by Petitioner in a

timely manner and received by the Appeals Unit. Your assigned counsel herein filed a

Notice of Appearance on behalf of the Petitioner. The Unit acknowledged receipt of the
Notice and counsel was informed that the final date for perfection of the appeal is April
19, 2019. This petition is within the statutory period granted for the perfection of an
appeal.

BACKGROUND

The Petitioner is currently serving a sentence of 25 years to life for Murder in the
Second Degree. The instant offense also resulted in the following sentences, which are
now expired: Robbery in the First Degree, three counts, 8 1/3 years to 25 years;

Attempted Murder in the Second Degree, 8 1/3 years to 25 years; and Criminal

Possession of a Weapon in the Second Degree, 5 years to 15 years. This was

Petitioner’s seventh appearance before the Board.
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APPEAL GROUNDS - STATUTORY AUTHORITY

This appeal is based, in part, upon the provisions of New York Executive Law

. . all determinations made pursuant to this

Section 259-i(4), which states, in part, t h a t

section may be appealed in accordance with rules promulgated by the board." The

relevant regulations thereunder are found in 9 New York Code of Rules and Regulations
("NYCRR") Part 8006.

In addition, the applicable regulations state, in part:
8006.3 Questions on appeal .
( a) The following questions may be raised on appeal from a minimum period of
imprisonment or release proceeding:

(1) whether the proceeding and/or determination was in
violation of lawful procedure, was affected by an error of
law, was arbitrary and capricious or was otherwise
unlawful;
(2) whether the board member or members making the
determination relied on erroneous information as shown
in the record of the proceeding, or relevant information
was not available for consideration;
(3) whether the determination made was excessive. 9
NYCRR 8006.3(a)(1)-(3).

2
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AS FOR A CHALLENGE (Board’s Determination Was Unlawful, Arbitrary and
Capricious Because the Board Failed to Follow the Legislative Mandate Set Forth in

Executive Law Section 259-c(4), Mandating the Establishment of Written Procedures For
Making Parole Determinations)

Petitioner herein argues that, in accordance with 9 NYCRR 8006.3(a)(1), the
proceeding and/or determination was in violation of lawful procedure, was affected by

an error of law, was arbitrary and capricious, was rendered without jurisdiction, or was

otherwise unlawful. Specifically, Petitioner argues that the Board failed to comply with
the legislative mandate set forth in Executive Law Section 259-c( 4), requiring the
establishment of written procedures for use in making parole determinations.

New Regulations Effective as of July 31, 2014

On December 18, 2013, DOCCS filed a Notice of Proposed Rule Making. The
proposed rules were adopted, and made effective as of July 31, 2014. The new rules
set out changes to four different sections of the New York Codes Rules and Regulations,

specifically 9 NYCRR Part 8001 and Sections 8002.1(a) and (b), 8002.2(a) and 8002.3.

The regulatory changes appear to be an attempt to comply with the statutorily mandated
changes that took effect on October 1, 2011.

•

9 NYCRR Part 8001 - This Part is repealed in its entirety because the 2011

amendments to Executive Law § 259-c(4) and § 259- i(l) removed the requirement that

3
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the Board of parole utilize guidelines for setting minimum periods of imprisonment and
making parole decisions.

•

9 NYCRR § 8002.1 - This section is amended to make the regulation

applicable to both genders (adding the word her and she) and making a change to the

name of the Commissioner to reflect the merger of old DOCS and the Division of Parole
so that the new name in the regulation reflects that it is the Commissioner of the

Department of Corrections and Community Supervision.

• 9 NYCRR § 8002.2 - This section is amended to insert a reference to the
newly named Department of Corrections and Community Supervision and to change the

language so that there is no longer a reference to a minimum term of an indeterminate
sentence being fixed by either the court or the Board of Parole. It is replaced with the
questionable language that the minimum period of imprisonment or parole eligibility date

can be fixed by the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision. (This

change is questionable since only a sentencing court sets the minimum term of

incarceration, not DOCCS).

•

9 NYCRR § 8002.3 - This is the only section where there is a change of

substance - if indeed one considers keeping the status quo a "change of substance."
This section was evidently written by the Parole Board to attempt to comply with the
requirement of Executive Law § 259-c( 4) which mandates that the Parole Board

"establish written procedures for its use in making parole decisions" and that "such
written procedures shall incorporate risk and needs principles to measure the

rehabilitation of persons appearing before the board, the likelihood of success of such

4
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person upon release, and assist the members of the state board of parole in

determining which inmates may be release to parole supervision."
The purported changes fall far short of the required statutory compliance. At best,
these changes create the illusion of compliance. The Board changed 9 NYCRR 8002.3 to
read that: "In making any parole release decision the following factors shall be
considered:" 9 NYCRR 8002.3 then goes on to list twelve factors. Ten of the twelve

factors are the same factors that were found in the old parole statute, Executive Law § 259-

i(2)(c)(A). The version of Executive Law § 259- i(2)(c)(A ), effective before October 1,

2011, contained eight factors, (i) through (viii). What this new regulatory proposal does
is take these eight factors, splits old factor ( vii) into three separate factors, and thereby
creates ten factors for the Parole Board to consider. The language of those ten factors

remains exactly the same as it was. The section is then changed to add two new
factors, making a total of twelve. The two new factors are:

(11)

the most current risk and needs assessment that may have been prepared

by the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision: and
(12)

the most current case plan that may have been prepared by the

Department of Corrections and Community supervision pursuant to section seventy-one-a

of the Correction Law.

5
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The New Regulations Do Not Comply With the Statutory Mandate of Executive
Law § 259- c(4) Effective on October 1, 2011

As set forth in 9 NYCRR § 8002.3, the risk and needs assessment instrument is

reduced to merely one of twelve factors that may be considered by the Board of Parole.
Since the Board of Parole has previously taken the position that it can give as much or

as little weight as it so chooses to any “factor,” the risk and needs principles
contemplated in the statute are de minimus in any given case. By enacting Executive

Law § 259-c(4) to specifically reference risk and needs principles, and not simply adding
the risk and needs assessment into Executive Law § 259-i, where the other factors are
referenced, it is clear that the Legislature intended that the risk and needs assessment

guide and give structure to every Board of Parole decision and not be treated merely as
one of twelve factors. Such an interpretation is consistent with the plain meaning of

Executive Law 259-c(4) which requires that the risk and needs assessment instrument
be used to measure “the likelihood of success of such persons upon release and assist
members of the state board of parole in determining which inmates may be released to

parole supervision.” If the instrument is relegated to a mere factor, the structure and
guidance contemplated by the amended statute is thwarted.
Although two new factors have been added for the Parole Board to consider,

"factors" should not be confused with "standards." The same standards of the old parole
statute and the old regulations remain intact.

6

DUTCHESS
cFILED:
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 5

INDEX NO.

COUNTY CLERK 11/12/2019 07:34 PM

RECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/12/2019
FUSL000102

The standard for cases where an Earned Eligibility Certificate has not been issued.
The same old standard, found in both the statute, Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)((A),
and 9 NYCRR § 8002.1(a), still applies:
Discretionary release on parole shall not be granted merely as
a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while
confined, but after considering if there is a reasonable probability that,
if such inmate is released, he or she will live and remain at liberty
without violating the law and that his or her release is not incompatible
with the welfare of society and will not so deprecate the seriousness of
his or her crime as to undermine respect for the law.

The standard for cases where an Earned Eligibility Certificate has been issued.
The same old standard, found in both the statute, Correction Law § 805, and 9

NYCRR § 8002.1(b), still applies:
Inmates...who have been issued such certificates ...shall be
granted parole ...unless the Board of Parole determines that there is a
reasonable probability that, if such inmate is release, he or she will not
live and remain at liberty without violating the law and that their release
is not compatible with the welfare of society.

It is fair to conclude that these “new procedures” change nothing and simply
maintain the status quo. And that is exactly what the Parole Board intended to do. By
writing the procedures in this way the Parole Board goes through the charade of writing

procedures that leave them with the discretion to maintain a crystal ball approach to parole

decision making, free to ignore risk and need principles.
The following quotes from written documents submitted by Parole Board counsel
make clear that the Parole Board clings to its discretion to rely on any one factor, of the

12 set forth, to the exclusion of others. The following statements are contained within
appellate briefs submitted on behalf of the Parole Board.

7
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. the Board may place whatever weight that it
•
deems appropriate to the information derived from a scored
COMPAS Re-Entry Risk Assessment when making its release
decision."

• “Executive Law § 259-c(4) and the associated
use of the COMPAS instrument do not abrogate the authority
of the Board of Parole to exercise its independent judgment in
placing whatever weight it deems appropriate to each of the
factors for discretionary release to parole supervision..."
• "The weight to be accorded each of the requisite
factors remains solely a matter of the Parole Board's
discretion."

•

"And it is well settled that the Board is vested
with the discretion to weigh the factors as it sees fit, is not
required to discuss every factor considered, and may place
particular emphasis on the serious nature of an inmate's
offense over other factors."

What this means, in practical terms, is that in any given case, even if eleven of the
factors weigh in favor of a parole applicant's release, the Parole Board may rely on just

one factor, i.e. factor 7, "the seriousness of the offense," to apply to and justify the standard
that there is not a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he or she will
live and remain at liberty without violating the law and that his or her release is

incompatible with the welfare of society and will so deprecate the seriousness of his

or her crime as to, undermine respect for the law. And so, in this way the Parole Board
is free to ignore the significant change intended by Executive Law § 259-c(4) and continue
to deny parole even to parole applicants who are ready to successfully reintegrate into the

community.

The Parole Board chose to minimize the significance of the COMPAS statute
[Executive Law § 259-c(4)] and the TAP statute (Correction Law § 71-a). They have

8
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relegated them to mere factors. If the Legislature intended for the risk and needs

principles to mere be factors to be accepted or rejected, as the Parole Board sees fit, then
the Legislature would have merely added them to the list of factors in Executive Law §

259-i(2)(c)(A). Instead, the Legislature amended the statute with the apparent purpose
of making the use of COMPAS a requirement, not just “a factor.”
The wording of the new factors in 9 NYCRR 8002.3(11) and 9 NYCRR 8002.3(12)
(hereinafter “11” and “12,” respectively) should not be overlooked. Pursuant to the

October 1, 2011 amendment, the use of the risk and needs assessment instrument and

TAP for parole decision-making is mandatory. However, the language of the new
regulations makes their use discretionary.

Regulation 9 NYCRR § 8002.3 factors (11) and (12) use the word “may” with
regard to the use of the risk and needs assessment instrument and TAP, indicating that
use of these instruments is discretionary. To comply with Executive Law § 259-c( 4), the
procedures must indicate that use of these two instruments, as set forth in factors “11”

and “12,” is mandatory, and that a parole release decision cannot be made without a
risk and needs assessment instrument and a TAP being provided to the Board of
Parole.
A fair reading of this regulation is that the Parole Board wrote this regulation so that
they do not have to consider the risk and needs assessment (COMPAS) or the "case plan"

if one was not prepared in a particular case, or if the COMPAS or TAP is two years old or
more.

The Legislature enacted the 2011 reforms because it had become obvious that the
old static factors and meaningless statutory references used by the Parole Board for

9
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repeatedly denying parole, such as "seriousness of the offense," were no longer
appropriate under a modernized, evidence-based parole scheme. Such phrases provided

neither a meaningful rationale for the decision, nor guidance to the parole applicant.
With the 2011 Legislative amendments came the expectation that the Parole Board
would use the risk and needs principles to better inform their decision-making. However,

with this expectation came no execution. The Board and DOCCS are still out of
compliance with Executive Law § 259-c(4), which became effective on October 1, 2011.

Instead of modernization, over the past two years since the enactment of the reform

of Executive Law § 259-c(4), the Parole Board has delivered more of the same
meaningless denials, even when parole applicants appeared with the lowest possible

COMPAS risk level scores, positive accomplishments on their "case plan" and superior

institutional records. The same old static factors continue to be the basis for a significantly
high rate of parole denials. In fact, in 2012, the denial rate for parole applicants going to

an initial Board rose dramatically from 43.5% in 2003 to 73.4 %.
For more than two years from October, 2011, the Parole Board refused to establish
written procedures and file them with the Secretary of State, as required by law. DOCCS

thumbed its nose at the Legislature, obstinate in its refusal to adopt the new procedures
required by law. Now, under pressure from the Legislature, a small portion of the
Judiciary, and advocates to establish written procedures, Parole has further shown their

disdain for the mandatory statutory changes by engaging in the charade of establishing
procedures that are meaningless. Parole’s audacity to place itself above the law is a

willful denial of the constitutional and statutory mandate of Executive Law § 259-c(4), that
became effective on October 1, 2011.

10
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On January 21, 2014, and March 14, 2014, The Legislature Reinforces its “Intent”

On January 21, 2014, the Board’s refusal to comply with the legislative mandate

was addressed directly in a letter to Counsel for the New York State Board of Parole
written by Daniel O’Donnell, Chairperson for the Assembly Standing Committee on

Correction, and Kenneth Zebrowski, Assembly Chair of Administrative Regulations

Review Commission. (Exhibit B). The letter from these two legislators was written, on
behalf of the New York State Assembly, in response to the Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking issued by DOCCS in December, 2013, concerning modifications to 9
NYCRR §§ 8001 and 8002 that purportedly implement statutory requirements enacted
during the 2011 legislative session. (Exhibit B). In the letter, the Assembly of the State of

New York states the following to DOCCS.
We were extremely disappointed to see that the proposed
rules contain no substantive change to the working
requirements of the Parole Board. Indeed, they fail to achieve
any change in the status quo , much less the significant change
envisioned at the time we negotiated the amendments. (Exhibit
B)(Emphasis added).
The letter goes on to state the following.
The proposed rules treat the requirements of §259-c(4) of the
Executive Law and §71-a of the Correction Law as mere additional
factors for consideration by the Parole Board. Had the Legislature
wished to add additional factors we would have done so. The
amended statutes of 2011 do not authorize or suggest
additional factors but instead require a change of procedure
and a change of perspective on the part of the Board . (Exhibit
B)(Emphasis added).

li
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On March 14, 2014, in the New York Law Journal, Assemblyman O’Donnell again

addresses Parole’s failure to comply with the legislative mandate imposed by the 2011
amendments to Executive Law Section 259-c(4). Specifically, Assemblyman O’Donnell is
quoted as saying, “[Parole] said we didn’t expect them to draft rules and regulations.

Yes, we did. And we expect them to follow the rules and regulations that they
draft.” (Exhibit C)(Emphasis added).

It is axiomatic that the duty of the judiciary is to uphold the intent of the
legislature. As stated in Pines v . State , 115 A.D.3d 80, 979 N.Y.S.2d 142 (2nd Dept.,
2014).
“Since the intention of the Legislature, embodied in a statute,
is the law, in the construction of statutes the basic rule of procedure
and the primary consideration of the courts is to ascertain and
give effect to the intention of the Legislature” (McKinney's Cons
Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 92, Comment). The concept of
legislative intent has been described as “the fundamental rule,” “the
great principle which is to control,” the “cardinal rule,” and “the
grand central light in which all statutes must be read” ( id. [internal
quotation marks omitted] ). “Indeed the Legislature's intent must be

ascertained and effectuated whatever may be the opinion of the
judiciary as to the wisdom, expediency, or policy of the statute”
( id. ). Where, as here, the Legislature has clearly manifested its
intent in enacting legislation, it is the duty of the courts to give
effect to that intent, not to disregard it. Pines , 115 A.D.3d at 99,
979 N.Y.S.2d at 156 (Emphasis added).

The case that does comport with the legislative intent, as defined in the Assembly’s
January 21, 2014 letter, and the March 14, 2014 article, is Matter of Morris v. New York

State Department of Corrections , 40 Misc.3d 266, 963 N.Y.S.2d 852 (Supreme Court,

Columbia County 2013). The reasoning in Moms should control.
In fact, the Board’s failure in drafting the proposed rules caused the Legislature to

call for a redraft. Specifically, the Legislature stated, ‘We request that the Board redraft
12
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the proposed rules in an effort to reflect both the content and the spirit of the
amended statutes. ” (Exhibit B at p. 3)(Emphasis added).

Over the past three years the Parole Board has revealed itself for what it is - a
Board that considers itself above the law and the constitution, contemptuous of the
legislature and the parole applicants who come before it, set in its old ways, intent on
meting out additional punishment, and unwilling to modernize and get in step with 21st

Century corrections. The new regulations that became effective on July 31, 2014 are as

defective as the early attempts by DOCCS to avoid amending their procedures to
comply with the October, 2011 statutory requirements.

Accordingly, the Petitioner seeks a finding that the Division, through its officers

and agents, on November 28, 2018, when the Petitioner was denied parole release,
proceeded, and continues to proceed without jurisdiction, or in excess of its jurisdiction,

was in violation of lawful procedure, was affected by an error of law, was arbitrary and
capricious or was otherwise unlawful. As such, this determination, by the Division,

should be vacated forthwith, and the Petitioner should be immediately released to
parole.

13
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There is a Good Faith Basis for Arguing that Parole and the Courts Have Directly
Defied the Legislative Intent of the 2011 Amendments

Prior to July 31, 2014, Parole Made Several Attempts to Comply with the
Legislative Mandate of the 2011 Statutory Amendments

Before July 31, 2014, Parole took numerous actions as a method of adapting to
the statutory changes that were effective on October 1, 2011. With regard to each of

Parole’s attempts, on March 13, 2014, the Third Department issued an opinion in the
case of Montane v. Evans , 116 A.D.3d 197, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, (3rd Dept. 2014) stating

the following.
.. . we cannot conclude that [the 2011 amendments]
transformed or otherwise altered the obligations of either the Board
in articulating its determinations or this Court in reviewing such
determinations. Montane , 116 A.D.3d at 203, 981 N.Y.S.2d at 871.

This decision clearly defies the legislative intent of the 2011 amendments to
Executive Law Section 259-c(4).
A New York Law Journal Article dated March 14, 2014 further addresses this
issue. (Exhibit C). In the article, Assemblyman Daniel O’Donnell is quoted as

reaffirming the Legislature’s clear intention - that the 2011 amendments were to
severely revamp the parole process. (Exhibit C). In the March 14, 2014 article,
Assemblyman O’Donnell is quoted as stating that, in light of the Appellate Division’s

decision in Montane , it will be necessary to draft new legislation to “correct the

14
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misreading of the law by the Third Department.” (Exhibit C). Assemblyman O’Donnell
is quoting as stating the following after the Montane decision.

I think the decision is wrong on many levels. They said
we didn’t expect them to draft rules and regulations. Yes, we
did. And we expect them to follow the rules and regulations
that they draft. If the judges are choosing to interpret out
intent so wrongly, we will make our intent specifically clear
and state that the regulations are required and the board has
to follow them . (Exhibit C)(Emphasis added).
This argument is reinforced in a letter to the Board of Parole, dated January 21,
2014, whereby the state legislature, through Daniel O’Donnell, Chairperson for the
Assembly Standing Committee on Correction, and Kenneth Zebrowski, Assembly Chair of

Administrative Regulations Review Commission, stated that the intent of the 2011
amendments was to severely revamp the parole process. (Exhibit B).

As of July 31 , 2014, New Parole Regulations Became Effective to Attempt to

Comply with the Legislative Mandate of the 2011 Statutory Amendments

The regulations that became effective July 31, 2014, were proposed by Parole in
December, 2013.

On January 21, 2014, the Assembly of the State of New York issued a scathing
attack on the proposed regulations.
Based on the clear statement of the legislative intent as set forth by
Assemblyman Daniel O’Donnell on January 21, 2014 (Exhibit B) the instant argument is

meritorious and there is a reasonable argument for extension, modification or reversal

of existing law. For these reasons, the following arguments are made.
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Parole Acted Without Jurisdiction and in an Arbitrary and Capricious Manner

In connection with its consideration of the Petitioner for parole, on November 28 ,

2018, the Parole Board did not use the procedures that it had been commanded by the
legislature to establish and use in the making of parole decisions. Because of that

failure, as explained below, the Parole Board’s decision to deny Petitioner parole was
arbitrary and capricious per se , and contrary to law.

On March 31, 2011, several significant amendments to the Executive Law were
signed into law, including an amendment to Executive Law Section 259-c(4). As

amended, Executive Law Section 259-c(4) requires the Parole Board to:
Establish written procedures for its use in making
parole decisions as required by law . Such written procedures
shall incorporate risk and needs principles to measure the
rehabilitation of persons appearing before the board, the
likelihood of success of such persons upon release, and
assist members of the state board of parole in determining
which inmates may be released to parole supervision .
(Emphasis added).

By its terms, Executive Law Section 259-c( 4) mandates “the adoption of new

rules(s) or regulation(s), i.e. the adoption of a ‘fixed, general principle to be applied by

an administrative agency...”’ Matter of Morris v. New York State Department of
Corrections , 40 Misc.3d 226, 230, 963 N. Y.S.2d 852, 855 (Supreme Court, Columbia
County 2013).

In Morris , the Supreme Court, Columbia County, made a judicial finding that

DOCCS failed to comply with the legislative mandate set forth in Executive Law Section
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259-c(4) by failing to establish the prescribed written procedures for use in making
parole determinations. As stated by the Morris court, “Disregard of a Legislative

mandate through an administrative agency’s inaction, as here, is arbitrary and
capricious and contrary to law.” Morris , 40 Misc.3d at 232, 963 N. Y.S.2 d at 857.

When the Morris decision was rendered, no regulations had been properly
promulgated according to the constitutional and statutory procedures required. It was
not until July 31, 2014 that the new regulations became effective. The substance of the

July 31, 2014 regulations fails to “incorporate risks and needs principles” as much as

any previous action by parole before July 31, 2014. By analogy, any hearing conducted
according to the new regulations is arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law.

The Morris case was remanded for a de novo hearing, to be held within 10 days,
at which the aforementioned infirmities were to be corrected. Morris , 40 Misc.3d at 236,

963 N. Y.S.2d at 860.

It is incumbent upon the Board to follow the relevant statutes, regulations,
policies and procedures. Matter of Bryant v. Coughlin , 77 N.Y.2d 642, 647-648, 569

N.Y.S.2d 582, 584 (1991); Matter of Garcia v. LeFevre , 64 N.Y.2d 1001, 1003, 489
N.Y.S.2d 48, 50 (1985); Morris , 40 Misc.3d at 232, 963 N.Y.S.2d at 857. Indeed, many
times over the past 25 years, the Parole Board disregarded filing requirements and

suffered the resulting judicial invalidation of its actions. See People v. Johnson , 180
A.D.2d 914, 580 N.Y.S.2d 957 (3rd Dept. 1992); Kinard v. New York , 173 Misc.2d 760,
662 N. Y.S.2d 346 (Sup. Ct. Erie Co. 1997); Matter of Jones v. Smith , 120 Misc.2d 445,
466 N. Y.S.2d 175 (Sup. Ct. Wyoming Co. 1983) afTd. 64 N. Y.2d 1003, 662 N.Y.S.2d 50

(1985).
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In the instant Petitioner’s case, the Board demonstrated a total disregard for the
clear mandate of Executive Law Section 259-c and other regulations, policies, or
procedures.

Without standards in line with the legislative intent behind the October, 2011
amendments to Executive Law 259-c(4), meaningful review of the decisions of

administrative agencies is frustrated. Accordingly, it is a cardinal principle of
administrative law that “...[an] administrative agency is forbidden from exercising its
discretionary power without first detailing standards or guides to govern the exercise of

that discretion.” Nicholas v. Kahn , 47 N.Y.2d 24, 34, 416 N.Y.S.2d 565, 571 (1979).
The safeguard against arbitrary administrative action lies in the promulgation of
adequate standards...” Nicholas , 47 N.Y.2d at 33, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 571.
In keeping with these principles, Executive Law Section 259-c( 4) specifically

commanded the Parole Board to establish such “standards or guides” in the form of

“written procedures” that incorporate “risk and needs principles.” For no apparent

reason, the Parole Board failed to comply, and still fails to comply, with that command.
“[I]t is fundamental that employees of any State agency must administer the law in
accordance with the will of the Legislature.” Nicholas , 47 N.Y.2d at 30, 416 N.Y.S.2d at
568. And thus, when, as here, an agency fails to establish procedures or guidelines, its

resulting decision is arbitrary and capricious as a matter of law. Nicholas , 47 N.Y.2d at
28, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 567.

Applying these principles in the instant case yields the necessary conclusion that

the parole board acted arbitrarily and capriciously by denying parole to the Petitioner
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without using the written procedures that the legislature commanded the agency to
enact and use.

The Regulations Effective July 31, 2014 Do Not Satisfy the Requirements of

Executive Law Section 259- c( 4)

Executive Law Section 259-c(4), effective October 1, 2011, requires the Parole
Board to establish written procedures incorporating risk and needs principles. There
are two significant changes brought about by the enactment of this new section of the

Executive Law. The first change is that previously, the law required only that the Parole
Board have “guidelines” for making parole decisions. Now, it requires something

different, written “procedures.” Second, the former statute permitted (“may”) the
discretionary use of a “risk and needs assessment instrument,” whereas the newly
amended statute requires (“shall”) the use of “risk and needs principles,” and a

fortiori requires the use of a risk and needs assessment instrument.

A comparison between the pre-amendment and post-amendment statutory
language is instructive, and demonstrates the significant and substantive change

intended by the Legislature.
Pre- Amendment
Executive Law Section 259-c(4):

Current
Executive Law Section 259-c(4):

Establish written guidelines for its
use in making Parole Board decisions as
required by law, including the fixing of
minimum periods of imprisonment or
ranges thereof of different categories of
offenders. Such written guidelines may
consider the use of a “ risk and needs

Establish written procedures for
its use in making Parole Board
decisions as required by law. Such
written procedures shall incorporate
risk and needs principles to measure
the rehabilitation of persons appearing
before the board, the likelihood of
19
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assessment” instrument to assist
members of the state Board of Parole in
determining which inmates may be
released to parole supervision.
(Emphasis added).

success of such persons upon release
and assist members of the state Board
of Parole in determining which inmates
may be released to parole supervision.
(Emphasis added).

As can readily be seen, the statute was amended in three specific ways. The

first is from “guidelines” to “procedures.” The second is from the consideration of an
“instrument” to the incorporation of “principles.” The third, and most important, is from

“may consider” to “shall incorporate.”
When the Legislature amends a statute, it is presumed that the amendment was
made to affect some purpose and make a material change in the existing law. See
Matter of Stein , 131 A .D.2d 68, 72, 520 N.Y.S.2d 157, 159 (2nd Dep’t. 1987). See also
People exrel. Sheldon v. Bd. of Appeals of City of N.Y. , 234 N.Y. 484, 495 (1923) (“We

must assume that the law-making body intended to effect a material change in the

existing law, otherwise the legislation would be nugatory.”); Mayfield v. Evans , 93

A.D.3d 98, 107, 938 N.Y.S.2d 290, 297 (1st Dept. 2012) (“It must be assumed that the
Legislature intended its 1991 amendment to be followed.”).
Although the pre-amendment version spoke of a discretionary use of an

“instrument” and the amended version speaks of a mandatory incorporation of
“principles,” those principles cannot be incorporated into procedures without an

instrument. Thus, use of a risk and needs assessment instrument is now mandatory.
The Third Department, in Garfield v. Evans , 108 A.D.3d 830, 968 N.Y.S.2d 262 (3rd
Dept. 2013), concluded that the under the amended statute the Parole Board must

consider a risk and needs assessment instrument. Indeed, for that reason, in the same
legislative session during which Executive Law Section 259-c(4) was enacted, the
20
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Legislature also enacted Correction Law Section 112( 4). This new subdivision explicitly
requires the development and implementation of a risk and needs assessment

instrument
The Commissioner and the Chair of the Parole Board shall
work jointly to develop and implement, as soon as practicable, a
risk and needs assessment instrument or instruments, which shall
be empirically validated, that would be administered to inmates. ..
(Correction Law Section 112(4)).

Given that risk and needs principles cannot be applied without an instrument,
and particularly in light of the enactment of Correction Law Section 112(4), the
procedures, at a minimum, must direct the Parole Board to use the assessment

instrument and explain how it should be used. That instrument, as explained below, is
the COMPAS.1 However, the regulations effective on July 31, 2014 fail to establish the
procedures required by the October 1, 2011 amendment to Executive Law Section 259-

c(4). These new regulations completely contradict the statutory requirement to use and
consider the COMPAS.
In a set of Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) distributed to the Parole Board

members during training, the COMPAS is described as “a document which embodies
the risk and needs principles contemplated by the Executive Law.” (Exhibit D). One
cannot incorporate risk and needs principles into procedures in the modern world of

“evidence based practice” without the use of an assessment instrument. The FAQ

The COMPAS Reentry Risk Assessment Instrument (COMPAS) is a fourth generation risk and needs
assessment instrument first developed in 1998 by Northpointe Public Institute for Public Management to
assess offenders' criminogenic needs and risk of recidivism. Northpointe, Practitioners Guide to
COMPAS (2011) p.1. Empirically developed, COMPAS focuses on predictors known to affect recidivism.
The COMPAS instrument provided to the Parole Board in each case they consider was specifically
designed by Northpointe for New York State.
1
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sheet that Parole Board Members were given explains the relationship between the
recent amendment to the Executive Law and the COMPAS instrument - specifically that

in order to incorporate risk and needs principles, one must use an assessment

instrument such as the instrument selected by DOCCS and the Chair of the Parole
Board, the COMPAS.2 (Exhibit D). The research and literature on risk and needs
principles also make it clear that these principles cannot be applied without an
assessment instrument and that they are “highly interdependent.”3

Both the law and logic require the conclusion that the regulations effective July
31, 2014 are not a statement of the “procedures” mandated by the amendment to the

Executive Law.
The conclusion that the regulations effective July 31, 2014 fail to set forth any
procedures is underscored by the regulations’ failure to explain that panels of the Parole

Board must use the COMPAS instrument or how to use it. As the Parole Board itself
has acknowledged, the COMPAS “is a document which embodies the risk and need
principles contemplated by the Executive Law.” (See Exhibit D).4 Although the

COMPAS is the embodiment of the risk and needs principles whose use is mandated by

2

See Evidence Based Practices FAQ’s (“FAQs”). R. 441.

Department of Justice and Crime & Justice Institute, Implementing Evidence-Based Practice in
Community Corrections: The Principles of Effective Intervention ( 2004) p.3 available at
http://static.nicic.gov/Library/019342.pdf. See also Risk -Need-Responsivity Model for Offender
Assessment and Rehabilitation (2007) p. 2 available at
www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cor/rep/risk_need_200706-eng.aspx; National Reentry Resources Center ,
Principles of Recidivism Reduction available at http://www.corrections.com/news/article/29737-principlesof-recidivism-reduction.
3

As described above, in the same legislative session during which Executive Law Section 259-c(4) was
enacted, the Legislature also enacted Correction Law Section 112(4). This new subdivision requires the
development and implementation of a risk and needs assessment instrument. Correction Law
Section 112(4). The COMPAS Reentry Risk Assessment Instrument is the instrument implemented as a
result of this Correction Law requirement.
4

22

DUTCHESS
cFILED:
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 5

INDEX NO.

COUNTY CLERK 11/12/2019 07:34 PM

n

1

RECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/12/2019
FUSL000102

the Executive Law, the new regulations fail to provide rules or procedures that guide
how COMPAS is to be used and considered in the parole decision. The only reference
to COMPAS in the new regulations is from 9 NYCRR 8002.3(11). The notion that the

new regulation constitutes the statutorily required “procedures” is particularly far-fetched
in light of the new regulation’s failure to mandate the use of COMPAS in parole

decision-making and to explain how to use it and the weight to give it.5
Accordingly, the Division of Parole has willfully violated the State Constitution

and statutes regarding required legal procedures.

That COMPAS is the instrument used by Parole to measure risks and needs is
not debatable. That there is a corresponding necessity for rules or procedures that

explain how COMPAS should be used, is also not seriously debatable. Any such

debate is mere sophistry.
The Frequently Asked Question (FAQ) sheet that Parole Board Members are
given explains the relationship between the recent amendment to the Executive Law

and the COMPAS instrument. (Exhibit D).
Q: Why is the Board using the COMPAS instrument at this
time?

A: For some time, the incorporation of evidence based
practices into the Parole Board’s decision-making practices has
been envisioned. More recently, the Executive Law was amended
(Executive Law Section 259-c[4]) so as to require the Board have
written procedures for its use in making parole decisions and that
such written procedures incorporate risk and needs principles to
measure the rehabilitation of persons appearing before the Board,
the likelihood of success of such persons upon release and assist
members of the Board in determining which inmates may be
released to parole supervision. The COMPAS instrument is a
document which embodies the risk and needs principles
5

The FAQs state that the COMPAS is just one of many things the Parole Board should consider in
determining whether to grant parole. (Exhibit D).
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contemplated by the Executive Law . (Exhibit D)(Emphasis
added).

The flaws of the new regulations are not limited to their omissions. The new
regulation does not explain how the new mandate to apply risk and needs principles in

making the parole release decision can leave unchanged the standard for assessing
release that existed under the prior version of the statute, when the use of a risk and
needs instrument was merely discretionary . In short, given that the statute previously
permitting Parole Boards not to use a risk and needs instrument, and necessary
principles was amended so as to require a parole board to always consider risk and
needs principles (which, by necessity requires a risk and needs instrument ), the new

regulation is, transparently, little more than an invitation to the Parole Board to

deliberately and willfully thwart the will of the Legislature.6

If the Legislature, when it mandated the enactment of written procedures, merely

intended for there to be a recitation of the old statutory factors and thought that it would

suffice for the new regulations to reshuffle the existing factors, then there would have
been no amendment to Executive Law Section 259-c( 4). But the statutory amendment

was not illusory or purposeless. The October 1, 2011 amendment required written

procedures, and required that the new written procedures incorporate risk and needs
principles to measure rehabilitation in aiding the process of determining which inmates
to release to parole supervision.

6 Assemblyman Aubry, who was largely responsible for setting this provision into the new statute said he
"intended the risk assessment to play a major role in helping the parole board determine if an offender is
ready for release.” NYLJ, Effect of Risk Assessment Rule on Parole Decisions Unclear , April 30, 2012.
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Further, in the same legislative session in which Executive Law Section 259-c(4)
was enacted, the Legislature also enacted Correction Law Section 71-a requiring the
development and use of a transitional accountability plan (TAP). The TAP is perhaps

best described as a case management plan. As a case management plan, it is based
on the individualized programming and treatment needs of the inmate. The plan is used
to prioritize programming and treatment for the person while in prison and also while

under release supervision. In one training document, TAP is described as a
coordinated case management plan which identifies the action which needs to take
place in order to effectively prepare an individual for release to community supervision,
guide programming and provide critical information to the Parole Board for release

decision making. Clearly, it is not a risk and needs assessment instrument.

It is beyond debate that the new regulations are not the written procedures
required by the statutory amendment. The Division of Parole has willfully and

deliberately violated the constitutional mandate to comply with its own enabling
legislation and regulations. Thus, any denial of parole release should be annulled.

Without written procedures that comply with the enabling legislation,
administrative agencies would have unfettered discretion to render decisions. That is
why the Legislature required such written procedures to guide the process. The

Legislature recognized the danger inherent when an agency exercises discretion in the

absence of written procedures. On its face, such unfettered discretion is arbitrary and
capricious. “The safeguard against arbitrary administrative action lies in the

promulgation of adequate standards....” Nicholas v. Kahn , 47 N.Y.2d 24, 33, 416

N. Y.S.2d 565, 571 (1979). Moreover, “it is fundamental that employees of any State

25

INDEX NO.

FILED: DUTCHESS COUNTY CLERK 11/12/2019 07:34 PM
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 5

RECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/12/2019
FUSL000102

agency must administer the law in accordance with the will of the Legislature.”
Nicholas, 47 N.Y.2d at 30, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 568. When an agency fails to establish
procedures or guidelines the resulting decision is arbitrary and capricious as a matter of

law. Nicholas , 47 N.Y.2d at 28, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 567. See also, Matter of Morris , 40
Misc.3d 226, 963 N.Y.S.2d 852. Not only is a decision made without first enacting
adequate procedures arbitrary and capricious, it is also contrary to the State

Constitution and relevant statutes. In this case, the Parole Board has simply, and
willfully, chosen to ignore the law and the State Constitution. “...[An] administrative
agency is forbidden from exercising its discretionary power without first detailing

standards or guides to govern the exercise of that discretion.” Nicholas , 47 N.Y.2d at
34, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 571.

The July 31, 2014 regulations still fail to comply with the legislative mandate in
the October, 2011 amendments to Executive Law 259-c.

Accordingly, for all the reasons set forth above, Petitioner should be released to
parole supervision. In the alternative, at a minimum, a de novo hearing should be

ordered to be held with instructions to comply with the Legislative mandate set forth in
Executive Law Section 259-c(4).
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AS FOR A CHALLENGE (Board’s Determination Was Unlawful, Arbitrary and
Capricious Because the Board’s Decision to Deny Parole Release Was Based Solely on the

Nature of the Instant Offense, in Violation of Executive Law Sections 259-i(2)(c)(A) and
259-c(4))

Petitioner herein argues that, in accordance with 9 NYCRR Part 8006.3(a)(1) and
(2), the proceeding and/or determination was in violation of lawful procedure, and/or

was affected by an error of law, and/or was arbitrary and capricious, and/or relied on

erroneous information and/or relied on relevant information, which was not available for
consideration, and/or was otherwise unlawful. Specifically, it is submitted that the
decision to deny parole release to Petitioner was based solely on the Board’s
perception of, and personal opinion regarding the instant offense.

The Petitioner was denied parole on this, his seventh appearance before the
Board. (Exhibit A ). The Board’s analysis, as set forth in its decision (Exhibit A at p. 2021), fails to consider Petitioner’s rehabilitative efforts and achievements, including the
favorable results of the COMPAS ReEntry Risk Assessment performed on Petitioner

(Exhibit E), Petitioner’s family support, his acceptance of responsibility, the fact that

Petitioner has compiled an impressive compendium of inmate program assignments
(Exhibit F). The Board ignored each of these positive factors in rendering its decision.
(Exhibit A at p. 20-21). Rather than comply with the relevant statutes and case law, the

Board instead chose to focus solely on the tragic nature of the instant offense.
The instant case represents yet another example of the Board’s express
disregard for the legislative mandate. As such, Petitioner’s situation represents a virtual
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replica of the factors presented to the Orange County Supreme Court in Rodriguez v.

New York State Board of Parole , 2016 N.Y. Lexis 5111 (Sup. Crt., Orange Cty. 2016)
(Exhibit G). In Rodriguez , the Court reversed the Board’s denial of parole, and

remanded for a de novo hearing where, as in the instant case, the “Parole Board’s

denial of parole which focused almost exclusively on the inmate’s crime, while failing to
take into account and fairly consider any of the other relevant statutory factors which
categorically supported [the] inmate’s release, was arbitrary and capricious.” Rodriguez
(Exhibit G at p. 5).
“The amendments to the parole statutes are ... designed to modernize decision-

making in the area of parole release.” Thwaites v. New York State Board of Parole , 34

Misc.3d 694, 699, 934 N.Y.S.2d 797, 801 (Sup. Crt., Orange Cty. 2011). “The most
important change is the replacement of static, past-focused ‘guidelines’ with more

dynamic present and future-focused risk assessment ‘procedures’ to guide the Parole

Board.” 34 Misc.3d at 699, 934 N.Y.S.2d at 801. “Such procedures ... will rationalize
parole decision-making by placing the focus primarily on who the person appearing

before the Parole Board is today and on whether that person can succeed in the
community after release, rather than - as under the previous ‘guidelines’ - on who the

person was many years earlier when he or she committed the crime. This is a shift of
potentially sweeping significance. [Citing] Professor Phillip M. Genty, Columbia Law

School, “Changes to Parole Laws Signal Potentially Sweeping Policy Shift,” NYLJ,
September 1, 2011.” Thwaites , 34 Misc.3d at 699, 934 N.Y.S.2d at 801.

It is incumbent upon the Board to follow the relevant statutes, regulations,

policies and procedures. Matter of Bryant v. Coughlin , 77 N.Y.2d 642, 647-648, 569
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N.Y.S.2d 582, 584 (1991); Matter of Garcia v. LeFevre, 64 N. Y.2d 1001, 1003, 489
N. Y.S.2d 48, 50 (1985).

As stated in Thwaites ,
Here, the Parole Board relied almost entirely on the nature of
petitioner’s crime in denying parole. While his institutional
accomplishments and release plans were noted, the Board focused
on the circumstances of the crime committed twenty-five years ago.
When the Board reasoned that petitioner’ s discretionary
release was inappropriate and incompatible with the welfare of
the community so as to deprecate the seriousness of the
crime as to undermine the respect for the law, it was
employing past-focused rhetoric, not future- focused risk
assessment analysis. Such reasons fail to sustain a rational
determination on the inquiry at hand: whether there is a
reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will
live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his
release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will
not deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine
respect for the law. Executive Law 259-i[2][c]. 34 Misc.3d at 700,
934 N.Y.S.2d at 801-802. (Emphasis added).
“The role of the Parole Board is not to resentence petitioner according to the

personal opinions of its members as to the appropriate penalty for [the petitioner’s
instant offense], but to determine whether, as of this moment, given all the relevant
statutory factors, he should be released.” King v. NYS Div . of Parole, 190 A.D.2d 423,

432, 598 N. Y.S.2d 245, 251 (1st Dept., 1993), Aff’d 83 N. Y.2d 788, 610 N.Y.S.2d 954
(1994)(Emphasis Added).

While acknowledging that the Parole Board has the authority to grant
discretionary release, such discretion must, nonetheless, be exercised in accordance

with statutory and regulatory guidelines. In this case, Executive Law Section 259i(2)(c)(A), mandates that the Board use the procedure adopted in Executive Law
Section 259-c and consider certain factors when considering an inmate’s release on
29
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parole. In the instant case, the Board failed to consider the statutory factors, and

instead based its decision to deny parole release solely on the nature of the instant

offense.
The decision from Petitioner’s November 28, 2018, reappearance before the

Board, states the following.
I, parole denied. Hold 24 months. Next
appearance, November 2020.

Following a personal interview, record review and
deliberation, this Panel finds that your release to supervision is
incompatible with the public safety and welfare . Therefore,
parole at this time is denied.
We have considered your COMPAS Risk and Needs
Assessment . Significant weight has been placed on your poor
behavior during this term. You have incurred more than twenty
disciplinary reports.

Your high COMPAS prison misconduct score reflects your
poor compliance with DOCCS rules. You are serving a sentence
with a twenty-five- year minimum. Records show that your
most recent report occurred in May of 2015 .
We have reviewed your programming, Case Plan, and
discussed your learning difficulties. Also discussed were the
Sentencing Minutes, and include comments made in later
letters from the district attorney .
Your family support and limited criminal record are
reflected in low COMPAS scores, which are positive .
Documents you submitted are generally from past parole
interviews, but were considered.
Most compelling this Panel finds you need to maintain a
clean disciplinary record, over a significant period of time. We also
encourage you to develop and document appropriate release plans.

To grant your release at this time would so deprecate
the seriousness of your offense as to undermine respect for
the law . Parole is therefore denied. (Exhibit A at p. 2021)(Emphasis added).
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The above reference to the statutory factors of which the Board purports to have
“considered" is perfunctory, at best. The hearing transcript is devoid of any evidence

that the Board conducted a substantive examination of the statutory factors.

Specifically, Petitioner’s his accomplishments, release plans, letters of recommendation,
acceptance of responsibility, institutional adjustment, COMPAS ReEntry Risk

Assessment, and family support were not afforded any meaningful review. (Exhibit A).
Rather than comply with the relevant statutes and case law, the Board instead

focused its inquiry solely on Petitioner' s instant offense. (Exhibit A). The inquiry was so
focused on the nature of the instant offense as to ignore the other statutorily prescribed
factors.
This argument is magnified and exacerbated in light of the fact that the Board
has chosen to focus almost exclusively on the nature of the instant offense in denying

Petitioner’s release to parole supervision on previous occasions as well. Notably,
Petitioner properly requested, pursuant to FOIL, that appellate counsel be provided with
each of those past decisions. (See Exhibit R). However, the Board failed to comply

with this request, and provided only the decisions set forth below. An argument with
regard to the Board’s failure to provide properly requested information is set forth

elsewhere in this appeal, and is incorporated by reference as if set forth fully herein.
Specifically, the decision from Petitioner’s fourth appearance before the Board,

held on December 18, 2012, states the following.
Parole is denied. Hold 24 months. Next appearance
11/2014.
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After a review of the record and interview, the panel has
determined that if released at this time your release would be
incompatible with the welfare of society and would so deprecate the
serous nature of the crime as to undermine respect for the law.

Your institutional record and release plans are noted.
Required statutory factors have been considered, including your
risk to the community, rehabilitation efforts and your needs for
successful re-entry into the community.
The Panel remains concerned, however, about the
extreme violence and callous disrespect for the law when your
co- defendant shot an off- duty 13- year veteran of the New York
City Police Department in the chest .
Jr., who identified himself as a police officer was coming to
the aid of his father-in-law who was being robbed and postil
whipped in the driveway of his Queens home. After your co|, shots were filed at his wife and
defendant shot
his brother-in-law who fortunately were not injured. You and
your co- defendants then fled in a stolen car.

Since your last Board appearance you incurred a Tier-Ill
disciplinary infraction for harassment. The Board notes your
completion of ART, work assignment, personal statement, and
petition for release from people who support you. There is also
community opposition to your release. All factors considered, your
release at this time is not appropriate. (Exhibit S at p. 1314)(Emphasis added).
Similarly, the decision from Petitioner’s third appearance before the Board, held
on February 8, 2011, states the following.

After a careful review of the record, a personal interview and
deliberation, parole is denied.
This Panel remains concerned about the serious nature
of the instant offense, Murder 2nd, ATT., Murder 2nd, Robbery
1st and CPW 2nd serving 25 years to life. In 1981, you, in
concert, shot and killed an off duty police officer during the
commission of a robbery. The violent and senseless nature of
your crime is a concern for this Panel .
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Your institutional accomplishments and release plans are
noted. You have received multiple Tier II and one Tier III
infractions since your last parole board appearance.
If released at this time, there is a reasonable probability you
would not live and remain at liberty without violating the law.

Your release at this time is incompatible with the welfare and
safety of the community. (Exhibit T)(Emphasis added).

Courts have consistently overturned parole denial decisions where, as in the
instant case, the Board’s decision to deny parole release is based solely on the nature
of the instant offense. “Where the Parole Board denies release to parole solely on the

basis of the seriousness of the offense, in the absence of any aggravating
circumstance, it acts irrationally ( see; Matter of Huntley v. Evans, 77 A.D.3d at 947, 910
N.Y.S.2d 112; and Matter of Mitchell v. NYS Div. of Parole , 58 A.D.3d at 743, 871

N.Y.S.2d 688).” Matter of Louis Gelsomino v. NYS Board of Parole , 82 A.D.3d 1097,
1098, 918 N. Y.S.2d 892, 892 (2nd Dept., 2011).
In such circumstances, the Board’s determination should be annulled. In the

Matter of Stokes v. Stanford, 43 Misc.3d 1231(A), 2014 WL 2598133 (Table), 2014 N. Y.
Slip Op 50899(U) (Sup. Ct., Albany County 2014)(Exhibit H), the Court vacated a denial

of parole where, as in the instant case, the decision was based purely on the nature and
seriousness of the instant offense. Specifically, the Stokes court stated:

The Court has also reviewed the ISR and the COMPAS,
neither of which conclude that if petitioner is released into society
he would place anyone at risk. Particularly, the COMPAS report
found him at low risks in all categories it considered. ... Reading
the record as a whole, including the transcript of the parole hearing,
the inescapable conclusion is that petitioner was denied parole
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simply on the basis of the serious nature of his crime. Although the
determination parrots the applicable statutory language, the Board
does not even attempt to explain the disconnect between it’s [sic]
conclusion and petitioner’s rehabilitation efforts and his low risk
scores. Matter of Stokes v. Stanford 43 Misc.3d 1231(A), 2014 WL
2598133 (Table), 2014 N.Y. Slip Op 50899(11) (Sup. Ct„ Albany
County 2014). (Exhibit H).

The factual circumstances in the instant Petitioner’s case are almost identical to
those presented in Stokes. Nothing in Petitioner’s Parole Board Report (Exhibit I), or
COMPAS assessment (Exhibit E), indicate, in any way, that if released into society, he
would place anyone at risk. In a parallel to Stokes , Petitioner’s COMPAS report found

him at low risks. Additionally, Petitioner’s program completion, release plans, and other
statutory factors were ignored by the Board. As in Stokes , the instant Petitioner was

denied parole release “simply on the basis of the serious nature of his crime.”
In the Matter of Louis Gelsomino v. NYS Board of Parole , 82 A.D.3d 1097, 918
N.Y.S.2d 892 (2nd Dept., 2011) the Appellate Division, Second Department found the
following.
. . . where the Parole Board denies release to parole
solely on the basis of the seriousness of the offense , in the
absence of any aggravating circumstances, it acts irrationally
( see Matter of Huntley v. Evans, 77 A.D.3d at 947, 910 N.Y.S.2d
112; Matter of Mitchell v. New York State Div. of Parole, 58 A.D.3d
at 743, 871 N.Y.S.2d 688). Here, in denying the petitioner’ s
application for release on parole , the Parole Board cited only
the circumstances of the underlying crimes and failed to
mention any of the other statutory factors, including his
excellent disciplinary record, his record of achievements while
incarcerated, as well as positive statements made by the
sentencing court (see Matter of Huntley v. Evans , 77 A .D.3d at
947, 910 N. Y.S.2d 112).” Gelsomino , 82 A.D.3d 1097, 918
N.Y.S.2d 892 (2nd Dept., 2011). Accordingly, the petitioner is
entitled to a new hearing and a new determination. Gelsomino,
82 A .D.3d at 1098, 918 N.Y.S.2d at 892, 893 (2nd Dept.,
2011)(Emphasis added).
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In the instant case, the Board relied upon the nature of the instant offense as the

basis for denial of Petitioner’s parole release application. (Exhibit A at p. 20-21). The
Board did make a perfunctory reference to the other statutory factors, but only to
mention that those other factors were “noted” by the Board. There is no substantive

discussion of the statutory factors in the Board’s decision. (Exhibit A at p. 20-21).
Similarly, in the Matter of Perfetto v. Evans (112 A .D.3d 640, 976 N.Y.S.2d 183

(2nd Dept., 2013), the Second Department held the following.
Although the written determination of the [Parole Board]
mentioned the petitioner’ s institutional record, it is clear that the
Parole Board denied the petitioner’s request to be released on
parole solely on the basis of the seriousness of the offense
( see Matter of Gelsomino v. New York State Bd. Of Parole, 82
A. D.3d 1097, 1098 ). The Parole Board’s explanation for doing
so was set forth in conclusory terms, which is contrary to law
( see Executive Law § 259-i[2][a]; Matter of Mitchell v. New York
State Div. of Parole, 58 A.D.3d 742, 743 ).
Accordingly, the petitioner is entitled to a new hearing
and a new determination. Matter of Perfetto, 112 A.D.3d 640,
641, 976 N.Y.S.2d 183 (2nd Dept., 2013).

The instant Petitioner’s case is almost an exact replica of Matter of Rabenbauer
v. New York State DOCCS (2014 Slip Op 24347, Supreme Court, Sullivan County,

2014)(Exhibit J). In Rabenbauer , the Court reversed the parole Board’s denial of
parole, and ordered a de novo hearing where, as in the instant case, the Board based
its decision solely on the nature of the instant offense. In reaching its decision, the

Rabenbauer Court held the following.
The Commissioners based their decision to deny parole
release to Petitioner solely only their personal opinions of the
nature of the instant offense , improper characterizations of
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Petitioner’ s actions immediately following the murder, did not
consider all of the guidelines or factors, the decision was in
conclusory terms and unsupported by the record, and at least
one Commissioner was argumentative and appeared to have
made the decision prior to the parole interview . Matter of
Rabenbauer v. New York State DOCCS (2014 Slip Op 24347,
Supreme Court, Sullivan County, 2014)(Exhibit J) (Emphasis
added).
The Court went on to state the following of the Board’s decision in Rabenbauer.
There is no additional rationale , other than the Board’ s
opinion of the heinous nature of the instant offense, and
personal beliefs and speculations, to justify the denial of
parole release: Petitioner has had a close to perfect
disciplinary record while incarcerated , has had and continues to
have outside clearance without incident, has completed college
courses and at least one degree while in prison, has
completed every program offered by DOCCS as well as
additional programs; his non-felony youthful offender history
is unremarkable , and there is nothing in the record to suggest
Petitioner had any type of escalating history of violence
leading up to the instant offense. Petitioner submitted
numerous letters of recommendation for his release from
corrections officers, officials, and members of the community.
He has a substantial support system on the outside, release
plans, and housing ready upon his release. Matter of
Rabenbauer v. New York State DOCCS (2014 Slip Op 24347,
Supreme Court, Sullivan County, 2014)(Exhibit J).
In the instant Petitioner’s case, the Board based its decision to deny parole

release squarely on the nature of the instant offense, did not consider all of the statutory

guidelines or factors, and rendered a conclusory decision which was unsupported by
the record. (Exhibit A). In Rabenbauer , the Court overturned the decision of the Parole
Board and ordered a de novo hearing. (See Exhibit J). The same result is required in

the instant case.
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In Rodriguez , as in the instant case, the Board’s decision leaves Petitioner

without any reasonable clue how to change the outcome at his next appearance. In
Rodriguez , the Court determined that “The Court is unable to determine, by reading the
transcript of the Board’s decision, what factors, if any, other than the nature of
petitioner’s offense were considered. Such a patently inadequate decision

inappropriately forecloses the possibility of intelligent review...” Rodriguez (Exhibit G at

p. 8). The instant decision bears an uncanny resemblance to the decision in Rodriguez.

In such circumstances, the Board’s decision must be reversed.

The Rodriguez court summarized Petitioner’s situation in the following statement:
The instant matter, like so many others, arises from the
Board's failure to abide by statutory mandates. The Board is without
authority to ignore the command of the Legislature. In continuing to
issue such manifestly inadequate decisions despite a clear
Legislative mandate, and in the face of so many cases in the courts
of this state which reinforce that mandate, the Board is essentially
thumbing its nose at the Legislature and the courts. Such behavior
cannot be condoned.
Until the Board begins to satisfy the mandates issued by the
Legislature, the duplication of the Board's work will continue. The
courts of this state are constrained to remand to the Board all
cases, like the instant matter, in which the Board has issued a
decision that is so woefully deficient that it fails to apprise the
prisoner of the reasons for his denial of release, and is so lacking in
detail that it forecloses the possibility of intelligent appellate and
judicial review.

The Legislature has made clear the sort of explanation to
which a prisoner who has been denied parole is entitled. The courts
[*20] will continue to enforce the requirement announced by the
Legislature so long as it remains necessary. However, for the
courts of this state to repeatedly entertain petitions and issue
decisions ordering de novo parole hearings because the Board fails
to follow a clear statutory standard is wasteful of the time of all
involved and of the resources of the State. The Board's failure to
provide detailed, non-conclusory reasons for its denials of release
cannot continue. Rodriguez (Exhibit G at p. 8).
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Petitioner was denied parole release on the sole basis of the seriousness of the
instant offense. Accordingly, Petitioner should be entitled to a de novo hearing in
accordance with Huntley , Mitchell , Gelsomino , Perfetto , Stokes , Rabenbauer , and

Rodriguez.

AS FOR A CHALLENGE (Board’s Determination Was Unlawful, Arbitrary and
Capricious Because the Board Failed to Adequately Consider the COMPAS ReEntry Risk
Assessment for the Petitioner, as Mandated by Executive Law Sections 259-i(2)(c)(A) and

259-c(4))

Petitioner herein argues that, in accordance with 9 NYCRR Part 8006.3(a)(1) and
(2), the proceeding and/or determination was in violation of lawful procedure, and/or
was affected by an error of law, and/or was arbitrary and capricious, and/or relied on

erroneous information and/or relied on relevant information, which was not available for
consideration, and/or was otherwise unlawful. Specifically, it is submitted that the Board
failed to adequately consider the COMPAS ReEntry Risk Assessment for the Petitioner

as required by Executive Law Sections 259-i(2)(c)(A) and 259-c(4).

Petitioner was denied parole on this, his seventh appearance before the Board.
(Exhibit A). The Board’s analysis, as set forth in its decision (Exhibit A at p. 20-21 ), fails
to consider the favorable results of the COMPAS ReEntry Risk Assessment performed

on Petitioner. (Exhibit E).
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While acknowledging that the Parole Board has the authority to grant
discretionary release, such discretion must, nonetheless, be exercised in accordance

with statutory and regulatory guidelines. In this case, Executive Law Section 259i(2)(c)(A ), mandates that the Board use the procedure adopted in Executive Law

Section 259-c and consider certain factors when considering an inmate’s release on
parole. One of the procedures set forth in Executive Law Section 259-c(4) mandates

that the Board shall “establish written procedures for its use in making parole decisions

as required by law. Such written procedures shall incorporate risk and needs
principles to measure the rehabilitation of persons appearing before the Board,
the likelihood of success of such persons upon release , and assist members of the

state board of parole in determining which inmates may be released to parole
supervision.” ( Emphasis added).
“The amendments to the parole statutes are ... designed to modernize decision-

making in the area of parole release.” Thwaites v. New York State Board of Parole , 34

Misc.3d 694, 699, 934 N. Y.S.2d 797, 801 (Sup. Crt., Orange Cty. 2011). “The most
important change is the replacement of static, past-focused ‘guidelines’ with more

dynamic present and future-focused risk assessment ‘procedures’ to guide the Parole

Board.” 34 Misc.3d at 699, 934 N. Y.S.2d at 801. “Such procedures ... will rationalize
parole decision-making by placing the focus primarily on who the person appearing
before the Parole Board is today and on whether that person can succeed in the
community after release, rather than - as under the previous ‘guidelines’ - on who the

person was many years earlier when he or she committed the crime. This is a shift of
potentially sweeping significance. [Citing] Professor Phillip M. Genty, Columbia Law
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School, “Changes to Parole Laws Signal Potentially Sweeping Policy Shift,” NYLJ,
September 1, 2011

Thwaites , 34 Misc.3d at 699, 934 N.Y.S.2d at 801.

It is incumbent upon the Board to follow the relevant statutes, regulations,
policies and procedures. Matter of Bryant v. Coughlin , 77 N.Y.2d 642, 647-648, 569

N.Y.S.2d 582, 584 (1991); Matter of Garcia v. LeFevre , 64 N.Y.2d 1001, 1003, 489
N.Y.S.2d 48, 50 (1985).

As stated in Thwaites ,
Here, the Parole Board relied almost entirely on the nature of
petitioner’s crime in denying parole. While his institutional
accomplishments and release plans were noted, the Board focused
on the circumstances of the crime committed twenty-five years ago.
When the Board reasoned that petitioner’s discretionary
release was inappropriate and incompatible with the welfare of
the community so as to deprecate the seriousness of the
crime as to undermine the respect for the law, it was
employing past-focused rhetoric, not future- focused risk
assessment analysis. Such reasons fail to sustain a rational
determination on the inquiry at hand: whether there is a
reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released , he will
live and remain at liberty without violating the law , and that his
release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will
not deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine
respect for the law. Executive Law 259-i[2][c]. 34 Misc.3d at 700,
934 N. Y.S.2d at 801-802. (Emphasis added).

“The role of the Parole Board is not to resentence petitioner according to the

personal opinions of its members as to the appropriate penalty for [the petitioner’s
instant offense], but to determine whether, as of this moment , given all the relevant

statutory factors, he should be released.” King v. NYS Div. of Parole, 190 A .D.2d 423,

432, 598 N.Y.S.2d 245, 251 (1st Dept. 1993), Aff’d 83 N.Y.2d 788, 610 N. Y.S.2d 954
(1994)(Emphasis Added).
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The results of the COMPAS ReEntry Risk Assessment performed on the
Petitioner indicate that he is a suitable candidate for release to parole supervision. In
fact, Petitioner received the best score possible in every category assessed.

Specifically, the COMPAS results indicate the following:

>

Overall Risk
o Risk of Felony Violence - “Low.” (Exhibit E at p. 1).
o Arrest Risk - “Low.” (Exhibit E at p. 1).
o Abscond Risk - “Low.” (Exhibit E at p. 1).

>

Criminal Involvement
o Criminal Involvement - “Low.” (Exhibit E at p. 1).
o History of Violence - “Low.” (Exhibit E at p. 1).
o Prison Misconduct - “Low.” (Exhibit E at p. 1).

>

Relationships / Lifestyle
o ReEntry Substance Abuse - “Unlikely.” (Exhibit E at p. 1).

>

Personality / Attitudes
o Negative Social Cognitions - “Highly Probable.” (Exhibit E at p. 1).
o Low Self-Efficacy / Optimism - “Probable.” (Exhibit E at p. 1).

>

Family

>

Social Exclusion
o ReEntry Financial - “Unlikely.” (Exhibit E at p. 1).
o ReEntry Employment Expectations - “Unlikely.” (Exhibit E at p. 1).

o Low Family Support - “Unlikely.” (Exhibit E at p. 1).

During the interview, the Board itself recognized that Petitioner’s COMPAS
assessment was positive. The Board stated, “As far as your information in the folder,

there are scores of low risk for felony violence.. . and you also have low risk of
arrest, absconding and criminal involvement . ” (Exhibit A at p. 13, 1. 4-8)(Emphasis

added).

In addition to the fact that Petitioner received a positive COMPAS assessment
(Exhibit E), Petitioner also exhibited considerable family support (See Exhibit A and
41

INDEX NO.

FILED: DUTCHESS COUNTY CLERK 11/12/2019 07:34 PM
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 5

fs

RECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/12/2019
FUSL000102

Exhibit E), received commendable work reports (Exhibit A at p. 5, 1. 4-6) and amassed
an impressive compendium of inmate programming assignments (Exhibit F).

Given the above factors, it is difficult to justify the denial of the Petitioner’s

release to parole supervision. This is especially true considering Petitioner was held for
the maximum time assessment permitted under the regulations, 24 months. (Exhibit A
at p. 20, 1. 7-8).

The Board failed to adequately consider the favorable results of Petitioner’s

COMPAS assessment in rendering its decision. (Exhibit A at p. 20-21). In such
circumstances, the Board’s determination should be annulled. In the Matter of Stokes v.

Stanford, 43 Misc.3d 1231(A), 2014 WL 2598133 (Table), 2014 N. Y. Slip Op 50899(U)
(Sup. Ct., Albany County 2014)(Exhibit H), the Court vacated a denial of parole where,

as in the instant case, the decision was based purely on the nature and seriousness of
the instant offense. Specifically, the Stokes court stated:
The Court has also reviewed the ISR and the COMPAS,
neither of which conclude that if petitioner is released into society
he would place anyone at risk. Particularly, the COMPAS report
found him at low risks in all categories it considered. ... Reading
the record as a whole, including the transcript of the parole hearing,
the inescapable conclusion is that petitioner was denied parole
simply on the basis of the serious nature of his crime. Although the
determination parrots the applicable statutory language, the Board
does not even attempt to explain the disconnect between it’s [sic]
conclusion and petitioner’s rehabilitation efforts and his low risk
scores. Matter of Stokes v. Stanford 43 Misc.3d 1231(A), 2014 WL
2598133 (Table), 2014 N.Y. Slip Op 50899(U) (Sup. Ct., Albany
County 2014). (Exhibit H).
The factual circumstances in the instant Petitioner’s case are very similar to
those presented in Stokes . Nothing in Petitioner’s Parole Board Report (Exhibit I) or

COMPAS assessment (Exhibit E) indicates that, if released into society, he would place
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anyone at risk. In a parallel to Stokes , Petitioner’s COMPAS report found him at low

risks. (Exhibit E). Additionally, Petitioner’s program completion, release plans, and
other statutory factors were ignored by the Board. As in Stokes , the instant Petitioner
was denied parole release “simply on the basis of the serious nature of his crime.”

Another case that is directly on point is the Matter of Louis Gelsomino v. New
York State Board of Parole 82 A .D.3d 1097, 918 N.Y.S.2d 892 (2nd Dept. 2011). The

Gelsomino , decision holds that “where the Parole Board denies release to parole solely
on the basis of the seriousness of the offense, in the absence of any aggravating

circumstance, it acts irrationally.” 82 A.D.3d at 1098, 918 N.Y.S.2d at 892.
As in Gelsomino , in denying the instant Petitioner’s application for release on
parole, “the Parole Board cited only the circumstances of the underlying crimes and
failed to mention any of the other statutory factors...” 2 A.D.3d at 1098, 918 N.Y.S.2d at

892-893.

Accordingly, given the total disregard for the clear mandate of the statutes and

cases cited above, the Petitioner should be released on parole. In the alternative, a de

novo hearing should be ordered before new commissioners, with instructions to
appropriately consider the results of the COMPAS ReEntry Risk Assessment performed

on the Petitioner.
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AS FOR A CHALLENGE (Board Acted Unlawfully and In Error of Law by Failing to

Conduct the Analysis Required by Executive Law § 259-i and Failing to Consider the
Required Element of “Remaining at Liberty Without Violating the Law” in its Decision)

The Petitioner herein argues that, in accordance with 9 NYCRR 8006.3(a)(1), the
proceeding and/or determination was in violation of lawful procedure, was affected by

an error of law, was arbitrary and capricious, or was otherwise unlawful. Specifically, it
is submitted that, in making its decision to deny parole release to the Petitioner, the

Board failed to conduct the analysis required by Executive Law § 259-i and failed to
consider the required element of “remaining at liberty without violating the law”
particularly required by Executive Law § 259-i in its decision.

Executive Law § 259-i( 2)(c)(A ) requires that the Board’s decision be made after
“considering

if there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released,

he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his release is
not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so deprecate the

seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for law . ” (Emphasis added).
The decision from Petitioner’s November 28, 2018, reappearance before the
Board, states the following.
I, parole denied. Hold 24 months. Next
appearance, November 2020.
Following a personal interview, record review and
deliberation, this Panel finds that your release to supervision is
incompatible with the public safety and welfare . Therefore,
parole at this time is denied.

We have considered your COMPAS Risk and Needs
Assessment. Significant weight has been placed on your poor
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behavior during this term. You have incurred more than twenty
disciplinary reports.
Your high COMPAS prison misconduct score reflects your
poor compliance with DOCCS rules. You are serving a sentence
with a twenty-five-year minimum. Records show that your most
recent report occurred in May of 2015.

We have reviewed your programming, Case Plan, and
discussed your learning difficulties. Also discussed were the
Sentencing Minutes, and include comments made in later letters
from the district attorney.
Your family support and limited criminal record are reflected
in low COMPAS scores, which are positive. Documents you
submitted are generally from past parole interviews, but were
considered.
Most compelling this Panel finds you need to maintain a
clean disciplinary record, over a significant period of time. We also
encourage you to develop and document appropriate release plans..
To grant your release at this time would so deprecate the
seriousness of your offense as to undermine respect for the
law . Parole is therefore denied. (Exhibit A at p. 20-21)(Emphasis
added).

The specific analysis and language required by Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A) is
explicitly missing from the Board’s decision. The Board is specifically tasked with
“considering

if there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released,

he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law.” Executive Law § 259-

i(2)(c)(A)(Emphasis added).

The decision in the instant Petitioner’s case provides absolutely no reasonable
clue to the Petitioner as to why parole is being denied other than the fact that he has

committed the crimes for which he was convicted and sentenced. (Exhibit A at p. 20-

21).
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The Petitioner was denied parole and held for an additional two years on 7
consecutive previous occasions. (Exhibit L). On each of those occasions, the Board

relied on “the use of ‘nonstatutory, conclusory language, ’... impermissibly [leaving] the
reviewing Court to guess at the basis for the Board’s denial.” Matter of Vaello v. Parole

Board Division of State of New York, 48 A.D.3d 1018, 1018, 851 N.Y.S.2d 745, 747 (3rd
Dept., 2008), citing Matter of Prout v. Dennison , 26 A.D.3d 540, 541, 809 N.Y.S.2d 261,
541-542 (3rd Dept, 2006).

The repetition of this error over the course of seven consecutive appearances,

over 14 years, exacerbates the magnitude of the use of conclusory and non-statutory
language in each of the decisions.

The Supreme Court, New York County addressed this particular issue in Matter
of Turner v . NYS Board of Parole , 2009 NY Slip Op 51274 (U), (Sup. Crt., NY County,

June 24, 2009)(Exhibit M). The Supreme Court held the following.
Particularly, nothing in respondent’s decision or the
hearing transcript shows that respondent considered whether
there is a reasonable possibility that, if petitioner is released,
she "will live and remain at liberty without violating the law",
as Executive Law § 259-i (2) (c) (A) mandates . Although
respondent is not required to discuss every factor in its decision
( Matter of King v New York State Div. of Parole , 83 N.Y.2d 788,
791 [1994]; Matter of Walker v Travis, 252 A.D.2d 360, 362 [1st
Dept 1998]), the Court of Appeals stated in Matter of Silmon v
Travis (95 N.Y.2d 470, 477 [2000]) that at the inmate petitioner's
parole release hearing respondent was "required to assess
whether he presented a danger to the community, or whether
there was a reasonable probability that he could live at liberty
without repeating his offense." For a denial of parole to be set
aside by a court, respondent must have acted irrationally "bordering
on impropriety ...." (Matter of Russo v New York State Bd. of
Parole , 50 N.Y.2d 69, 77 [1980].) Petitioner has to show that
respondent did not consider all relevant factors (Matter of Garcia v
New York State Div. of Parole , 239 A.D.2d 235, 239 [1st Dept
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1997]). If respondent determined the above factor under Executive
Law § 259-i (2) (c) (A) based only on the seriousness of the crimes
of which petitioner was convicted, that would be "irrational
bordering on impropriety", and respondent's determination would
have to be vacated ( see, Matter of Wallman v, Travis , 18 A.D.3d
304, 311, 794 N.Y.S.2d 381, 389 (1st Dept, 2005).
Here, there is no statement or showing in the transcript
of the hearing that respondent considered that required factor
at all. The sole reason stated by respondent in its decision
denying petitioner parole was the seriousness of the crimes of
which petitioner was convicted and that her release would be
incompatible with the welfare of the public because her
release would deprecate the seriousness of her crimes so as
to undermine respect for the law, which are other factors that
respondent has to consider under Executive Law § 259-i (2) (c)
( A) . Quite possibly, respondent did not speak to the required factor
because at this point in time respondent very well could not state
that petitioner is a danger to the community and that there is not a
reasonable probability that she can live free outside jail without
again violating the law.
Therefore, by this court's separate June 18, 2009 decision,
order, and judgment, the petition has been granted to the extent
of directing respondent to hold a de novo parole release
hearing forthwith. It is for respondent to exercise its discretion to
grant parole release, not this court. Upon the new hearing,
respondent should, and must, consider whether petitioner has
evidenced through her behavior during her last several years
in prison that she has redeemed herself and, in reasonable
probability, can now live in society without violating the law.
We, as a civilized society, must remain hopeful that those who
break the law can rehabilitate themselves, with help while in prison,
before their maximum sentencing period is reached. Petitioner has
spent much more time incarcerated than her minimum sentence,
and has significantly utilized the time to benefit herself and others in
many ways. Petitioner herself said at her April 2008 parole release
hearing that, although she could never change what happened on
the day of the shootings, she is a changed person, and, if she is
given the opportunity, she would be "a good member of society"
and start her life over again. She stated that she wants a chance. It
will be up to respondent to give her that chance, and to her if she is
given the opportunity, to use that chance to live a better life, for her
sake and the sake of those she encounters in life. (Exhibit M at p.
5-6)(Emphasis added).
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The Board is required to conduct the analysis mandated by the statute and
regulations. Matter of Darryl King v. NYS Division of Parole , 83 N.Y.2d 788, 791, 610

N.Y.S.2d 954, 955 (1994); Matter of Chester Aimonor v. NYS Division of Parole , 16

Misc.3d 1126(A ), 847 N.Y.S.2d 900, 2007 WL 2379719 (Sup. Ct „ NY Cty.
2007)(Unreported disposition) (Exhibit N at p. 4); Matter of Chester Aimonor v. NYS

Division of Parole , 15 Misc.3d 1116(A), 839 N.Y.S.2d 431, 2007 WL 1018211 (Sup. Ct.
NY Cty., 2007)(Unreported disposition) (Exhibit O at p. 3); Matter of Jean Coaxum v.
NYS Division of Parole , 14 Misc.3d 661, 672, 827 N.Y.S.2d 489, 498 (Sup. Ct. Bronx

Cty., 2006).

The Fourth Department dealt with what constitutes serious examination of the
statute’s requirements in Matter of Cummings , 45 A.D.2d 222, 224, 357 N. Y.S.2d 260,
263 ( 4th Dept. 1974).

We come now to the central question involved in this
proceeding: must the State Board of Parole give its reasons when
parole is denied to a prisoner who appears before it? We hold that
due process considerations as well as the public policy of this State
require that a meaningful statement of reasons be furnished to
every applicant who has been denied parole release in the exercise
of discretion delegated to the Board of Parole.
“As stated by another court of this state, this relator, by all indications, appears

suited for parole and yet the parole board has given petitioner no guidance as to what is
expected of him to qualify for parole thereby giving no considerations to the

rehabilitative objectives of modern penology.” People ex rel. Bermudez v. Kuhlmann ,
87 Misc.2d 975, 977, 386 N. Y.S.2d 772, 774 (Cty. Ct. Dutchess Cty., 1976) citing ,
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People ex rel. Schaurerv. Smith , 81 Misc.2d 1039, 1042-1043, 367 N. Y.S.2d 707, 710711 (Cty. Ct. Wyoming Cty., 1975).
“The use of ‘nonstatutory, conclusory language,’ such as that employed by the

Board here, impermissibly leaves the reviewing Court to guess at the basis for the
Board’s denial.” Matter of Vaello v. Parole Board Division of State of New York, 48

A.D.3d 1018, 1018, 851 N.Y.S.2d 745, 747 (3rd Dept., 2008), citing Matter of Prout v.

Dennison , 26 A.D.3d 540, 541, 809 N.Y.S.2d 261, 541-542 (3rd Dept, 2006).
As previously decided by the Supreme Court, New York County in Turner , 2009

NY Slip Op 51274 (U), (Sup. Crt., NY County, June 24, 2009)(Exhibit M at p. 5-6), and
the Appellate Division, Third Department, in Vaello , 483 A.D.3d at 1018, 851 N.Y.S.2d
at 747, “a new hearing and decision consistent with the statutory criteria are required.”

Accordingly, the Petitioner should be granted de novo hearing that should be

conducted and decided pursuant to the terms of the statute and regulations.

AS FOR A CHALLENGE ( Determination is Conclusory and Does Not Adequately State
Basis for Decision )

The Petitioner herein argues that, in accordance with 9 NYCRR 8006.3(a)(1), the
proceeding and/or determination was in violation of lawful procedure, was affected by

an error of law, was arbitrary and capricious or was otherwise unlawful. Specifically, it
is submitted that the Board’s decision to deny parole release to the Petitioner violates

the statute in that the decision is stated in conclusory terms without sufficient support or
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justification. It merely parrots some of the statutory language and does not provide any

substantive statement for the basis for the decision.
The decision in the instant Petitioner’ s case provides absolutely no reasonable
clue to the Petitioner as to why parole is being denied other than the fact that he has
committed the crimes for which he was convicted and sentenced. (Exhibit A at p. 2021).

The decision from Petitioner’s November 28, 2018, reappearance before the
Board, states the following.
parole denied. Hold 24 months. Next
appearance, November 2020.

Following a personal interview, record review and
deliberation, this Panel finds that your release to supervision is
incompatible with the public safety and welfare . Therefore,
parole at this time is denied.
We have considered your COMPAS Risk and Needs
Assessment . Significant weight has been placed on your poor
behavior during this term. You have incurred more than twenty
disciplinary reports.

Your high COMPAS prison misconduct score reflects your
poor compliance with DOCCS rules. You are serving a sentence
with a twenty-five- year minimum. Records show that your
most recent report occurred in May of 2015 .
We have reviewed your programming, Case Plan, and
discussed your learning difficulties. Also discussed were the
Sentencing Minutes, and include comments made in later
letters from the district attorney .
Your family support and limited criminal record are
reflected in low COMPAS scores, which are positive .
Documents you submitted are generally from past parole
interviews, but were considered.
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Most compelling this Panel finds you need to maintain a
clean disciplinary record, over a significant period of time. We also
encourage you to develop and document appropriate release plans.
To grant your release at this time would so deprecate
the seriousness of your offense as to undermine respect for
the law . Parole is therefore denied. (Exhibit A at p. 2021)(Emphasis added).
Executive Law §259-i(2)(a) states in part “If parole is not granted upon such
review, the inmate shall be informed in writing within two weeks of such appearance of

the factors and reasons for such denial of parole. Such reasons shall be given in
detail and not in conclusory terms . ” (Emphasis added).

The Fourth Department held “that due process considerations as well as the
public policy of this State require that a meaningful statement of reasons be furnished to
every applicant who has been denied parole release in the exercise of discretion
delegated to the Board of Parole.” Matter of Cummings v. Regan , 45 A.D.2d 222, 224,

357 N.Y.S.2d 260, 263 ( 4th Dept. 1974), dismissed on ground of mootness , 36 N. Y.2d

969 (1975). ( See generally , People ex rel. Brown v. NYS DOCS Parole Bd. Div. , 67

A.D.2d 1108, 415 N. Y.S.2d 137 ( 4th Dept. 1979); Rossetti v. Hammock , 102 Misc.2d
315, 423 N. Y.S.2d 365 (Sup. Ct „ Albany Co. 1979)).

The purpose of the statute is clear. The Board is obligated to state the reasons

for denial of the parole. Such reasons should be sufficiently clear to indicate to the
inmate how he would need to change his behavior or thought processes in order to

become eligible for parole. It is submitted that merely parroting some of the statutory
language is insufficient and does not meet the requirements of the statute. To merely

recite some of the language in the statute does not apprise the inmate of the corrective
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steps he would need to take in order to become eligible for parole. Such conclusory

statements do not lend themselves to supporting the rehabilitation of the inmate. They
only serve to attempt to disguise the real basis for the decision.

A detailed explanation with evidentiary support is what the statute contemplates.

A detailed statement of the facts supporting the denial is required in order to satisfy Due

Process requirements. Matter or Watkins v. Caldwell , 54 A.D.2d 42, 44-45, 387
N.Y.S.2d 177,179 (4th Dept. 1976); Matter of Cummings , 45 A.D.2d at 224, 357
N. Y.S.2d at 263. “Simply stating that the parole is denied because of 'the nature of the
offense' for which he is incarcerated does not provide a meaningful statement of

reasons as required in this state.” People ex ret. Bermudez v. Kuhlman, 87 Misc.2d
975, 977, 386 N. Y.S.2d 772, 774 (Sup. Ct. Dutchess Cty., 1976) citing , Matter of
Cummings , 45 A.D.2d 222, 224, 357 N. Y.S.2d 260, 263 ( 4th Dept. 1974).
“As stated by another court of this state, this relator, by all indications, appears

suited for parole and yet the parole board has given petitioner no guidance as to what is
expected of him to qualify for parole thereby giving no considerations to the

rehabilitative objectives of modern penology.” Bermudez , 87 Misc.2d at 977, 386
N.Y.S.2d at 774 citing , People exrel. Schaurer v. Smith , 81 Misc.2d 1039, 1042-1043,

367 N.Y.S.2d 707, 710-711 (Cty. Ct. Wyoming Cty., 1975).

The case of In the Matter of Maye v. Russi , N.Y.L.J. p. 29, col. 4 (Feb. 5, 1996)
(Exhibit P), states the requirement very clearly:

The Parole Board decision does nothing more than track the
language in the statute, and it fails to consider the factors
enumerated in the Executive Law. Moreover, it contains no
analysis or factual basis. As a result, there is no basis stated for
the conclusion of the Parole Board: the logical connection which
demonstrates why Petitioner’s crime automatically translates into a
52
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“reasonable probability” Petitioner will break the law if she is
released, is missing. Without a reason stated, the decision lacks
the detail required in 9 N.Y.C.R.R. Sec. 8002.3(d). (Exhibit P).
The case of Chan v. Travis is also on point. NYLJ 02/27/2003 p. 28, col. 4 (Sup.

Ct., Albany Cty.)(Exhibit Q). In Chan the Panel refused to release a Petitioner who had
been convicted of a violent felony. The Panel’s decision in that case was brief and cited

the seriousness of the offense, a prior record, and note was made of petitioner’s
positive institutional adjustment. In Chan , the court reinforced the importance of the

Board providing sufficient support and justification for its decision. The Court noted:
Moreover, on this record, the Board’s decision lacks the
detail required by Executive Law Section 259-i(2)(a), as it is
insufficient for the Board to do no more than merely “note” this
petitioner’s “positive adjustment to incarceration.” Petitioner’s
exemplary institutional record - not a single misbehavior report,
academic achievements with honors, excellent work record and
institutional adjustment, coupled with petitioner’s repeated
expressions of remorse - exemplifies the “strong rehabilitative
component” (Matter of Silmon v. Travis , 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477)
underlying the statutory scheme and inherent in an indeterminate
sentencing structure. NYLJ 02/27/2003 p. 28, col. 4. (Exhibit Q at
p. 5).
To hold that the Board’s statement of the factors and
reasons for denial in this Petitioner’s case is sufficient would
condone the Board’s apparent disregard of the rehabilitative
component of the indeterminate sentencing and parole statutes.
“Noting” an Inmate’s positive institutional adjustment or
achievements in the written decision is not tantamount to
considering them in a fair, reasoned and individualized manner.
Indeed, such cursory treatment turns on its head the reformative or
rehabilitative principle underlying an indeterminate sentence. NYLJ
02/27/2003 p. 28, col. 4. (Exhibit Q at p. 5).
The Court then went on to hold:

The Board’s exclusive reliance on the seriousness of
petitioner’s crimes is not supported by this record, and the Board’s
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failure to adequately explain its denial of parole, particularly in light
of petitioner’s most remarkable institutional and rehabilitative record
is improper. Thus the determination bears the hallmarks of arbitrary
decision making. NYLJ 02/27/2003 p. 28, col. 4. (Exhibit Q at p.
5).

In the instant Petitioner’s case, the Board’s decision (Exhibit A at p. 20-21), is
virtually identical to the decision that was held insufficient by the Albany County
Supreme Court in Chan. Based on Chan , the instant Petitioner should be given a de

novo hearing.
The Fourth Department addressed this particular issue in Matter of Daniel

Johnson v. NYS Board of Parole , 65 A.D.3d 838,884 N.Y.S.2d 545 ( 4th Dept. 2009). In
Johnson “the only reason for the Parole Board's denial of parole that is discernable [sic]

from the perfunctory reference to '[t]he violence associated with this terrible crime’ is
that the determination was based solely upon the seriousness of the crime.” 65 A.D.3d
838, 884 N.Y.S.2d at 547. The Fourth Department held that this language was

conclusory and ordered a new hearing. 65 A.D.3d 838, 884 N.Y.S.2d at 547.

The Board failed to meet the mandate of Executive Law §259-i(2)(a), requiring
the Board to set forth the reasons for a parole denial in detail and not in conclusory
terms. (See Executive Law §259-i(2)(a) and Exhibit A at p. 20-21). In such

circumstances, the Board’s determination should be annulled. In the Matter of Stokes v.

Stanford 43 Misc.3d 1231(A), 2014 WL 2598133 (Table), 2014 N. Y. Slip Op 50899(U)
(Sup. Ct., Albany County 2014)(Exhibit H) the Court vacated a denial of parole where,

as in the instant case, the decision was based purely on the nature and seriousness of
the instant offense. Specifically, the Stokes court stated:
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The Court has also reviewed the ISR and the COMPAS,
neither of which conclude that if petitioner is released into society
he would place anyone at risk. Particularly, the COMPAS report
found him at low risks in all categories it considered. ... Reading
the record as a whole, including the transcript of the parole hearing,
the inescapable conclusion is that petitioner was denied parole
simply on the basis of the serious nature of his crime. Although the
determination parrots the applicable statutory language, the Board
does not even attempt to explain the disconnect between it’s [sic]
conclusion and petitioner’s rehabilitation efforts and his low risk
scores. Matter of Stokes v. Stanford 43 Misc.3d 1231(A ), 2014 WL
2598133 (Table), 2014 N.Y. Slip Op 50899(U) (Sup. Ct„ Albany
County 2014). (Exhibit H).
The factual circumstances in the instant Petitioner’s case are almost identical to

those presented in Stokes. Nothing in Petitioner’s Parole Board Report (Exhibit /I) or
COMPAS assessment (Exhibit E) indicates that, if released into society, he would place
anyone at risk. In a parallel to Stokes , Petitioner’s COMPAS report found him at low

risks. Additionally, Petitioner’s program completion, release plans, and other statutory

factors were ignored by the Board. As in Stokes , the instant Petitioner was denied
parole release ‘simply on the basis of the serious nature of his crime.’

Another case that is directly on point is the Matter of Louis Gelsomino v. New
York State Board of Parole 82 A.D.3d 1097, 918 N. Y.S.2d 892 (2nd Dept. 2011). The

Gelsomino , decision holds that “where the Parole Board denies release to parole solely
on the basis of the seriousness of the offense, in the absence of any aggravating

circumstance, it acts irrationally.” 82 A .D.3d at 1098, 918 N. Y.S.2d at 892.
As in Gelsomino , in denying the instant Petitioner’s application for release on

parole, “the Parole Board cited only the circumstances of the underlying crimes and

failed to mention any of the other statutory factors, including his excellent disciplinary

record, his record of achievements while incarcerated,...” his excellent COMPAS
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assessment results, his complete lack of previous criminal history, and his release

plans. 82 A.D.3d at 1098, 918 N.Y.S.2d at 892-893.
“The use of ‘nonstatutory, conclusory language, such as that employed by the

Board here, impermissibly leaves the reviewing Court to guess at the basis for the
Board’s denial.” Matter of Vaello v. Parole Board Division of State of New York, 48
A .D.3d 1018, 1018, 851 N.Y.S.2d 745, 747 (3rd Dept., 2008), citing Matter of Prout v.

Dennison , 26 A.D.3d 540, 541, 809 N.Y.S.2d 261, 541-542 (3rd Dept, 2006).
As previously decided by the Third Department, “a new hearing and decision

consistent with the statutory criteria are required.” Vaello, 483 A .D.3d at 1018, 851

N.Y.S.2d at 747.
An analogous situation was reviewed in Morris , where the Supreme Court,
Columbia County vacated the Board’s denial of parole release, and remanded the case
back the Board for a new hearing. In the instant Petitioner’s case, as in Morris , “The
Board’s decision utterly failfs] to explain its reasoning for denying Petitioner parole.”

Morris , 40 Misc.3d at 235, 963 N.Y.S.2d at 859. The Morris court went on to state the
following.

Indeed, here, the Board failed to explain, other than the facts
of the crime, why Petitioner’s release was ‘incompatible with the
public safety and welfare’ and why there was ‘a reasonable
probability [he] would not live and remain at liberty without violating
the law.’ The Board ‘should be well able to articulate the reasoning’
for its decision, ‘if it were to come to reasonably, in a non-arbitrary,
uncaprecious manner.’ Morris , 40 Misc.3d at 235, 963 N.Y.S.2d at
859.
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It is respectfully submitted that the decision in the instant Petitioner’s case is
virtually identical to the decision in Cummings , Watkins , Bermudez , Maye , Chan ,

Johnson , Vaello, Morris, Stokes , and Gelsomino.
In the instant Petitioner’s case the Board violated the provision of the statute by
not stating the basis for its decision in sufficiently clear and distinct detail so as to
apprise the Petitioner of why his parole was being denied and what he can do to

improve his chances for Parole later. There is no indication in the record that the

Petitioner has been apprised by the determination of why the Board feels that he cannot
live beyond the walls of the prison; except the argument that he has been convicted of
crimes in the past. (Exhibit A at p. 20-21).

This argument is magnified and exacerbated in light of the fact that the Board
has employed similar conclusory language in denying Petitioner’s release to parole
supervision on previous occasions as well. Notably, Petitioner properly requested,
pursuant to FOIL, that appellate counsel be provided with each of those past decisions.

(See Exhibit R ). However, the Board failed to comply with this request, and provided

only the decisions set forth below. An argument with regard to the Board’s failure to

provide properly requested information is set forth elsewhere in this appeal, and is
incorporated by reference as if set forth fully herein.
Specifically, the decision from Petitioner’s fourth appearance before the Board,

held on December 18, 2012, states the following.
Parole is denied. Hold 24 months. Next appearance
11/2014.
After a review of the record and interview, the panel has
determined that if released at this time your release would be
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incompatible with the welfare of society and would so deprecate the
serous nature of the crime as to undermine respect for the law.

Your institutional record and release plans are noted.
Required statutory factors have been considered , including
your risk to the community, rehabilitation efforts and your needs for
successful re-entry into the community.
The Panel remains concerned, however , about the
extreme violence and callous disrespect for the law when your
co-defendant shot an off-duty 13- year veteran of the New York
City Police Department in the chest.
Jr., who identified himself as a police officer was coming to the aid
of his father-in-law who was being robbed and postil whipped in the
driveway of his Queens home. After your co-defendant shot
shots were filed at his wife and his brother-in-law who
fortunately were not injured. You and your co-defendants then fled
in a stolen car.

Since your last Board appearance you incurred a Tier-Ill
disciplinary infraction for harassment. The Board notes your
completion of ART, work assignment, personal statement, and
petition for release from people who support you. There is also
community opposition to your release. All factors considered,
your release at this time is not appropriate . (Exhibit S at p. 1314)(Emphasis added).
Similarly, the decision from Petitioner’s third appearance before the Board, held

on February 8, 2011, states the following.
After a careful review of the record, a personal interview and
deliberation, parole is denied.

This Panel remains concerned about the serious nature
of the instant offense, Murder 2nd, ATT. , Murder 2nd, Robbery
1st and CPW 2nd serving 25 years to life. In 1981, you, in
concert, shot and killed an off duty police officer during the
commission of a robbery. The violent and senseless nature of
your crime is a concern for this Panel .
Your institutional accomplishments and release plans
are noted. You have received multiple Tier II and one Tier III
infractions since your last parole board appearance.
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If released at this time, there is a reasonable probability you
would not live and remain at liberty without violating the law.
Your release at this time is incompatible with the welfare and
safety of the community. (Exhibit T)(Emphasis added ).
An examination of the entire person, of his demeanor, accomplishments, attitude
adjustment while incarcerated, and COMPAS assessment is required. It is clear that

such determination cannot be made solely on the Petitioner’s conduct before his

incarceration. To make an examination limited to the Petitioner’s conduct prior to
incarceration would clearly violate the statute’s intent and wording. More importantly, it

would make the entire parole process illusory and merely a sham for the whims of the
Panel at the time.
It is submitted that the Board’s determination is insufficient as a matter of law and
requires that, at a minimum, Petitioner be afforded a de novo hearing as soon as

possible.

AS FOR A CHALLENGE (Board Acted Arbitrarily, Capriciously and Unlawfully and in
Error of Law by Relying Upon Information That has not Been Provided to Petitioner’s
Appellate Counsel)

Petitioner herein argues that the proceeding and/or determination was in violation
of lawful procedure, was affected by an error of law, was arbitrary and capricious or was
otherwise unlawful, and the Board’ s determination relied on erroneous information as

shown in the record of the proceeding, in accordance with Regulation 8006.3(a)(1) &
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(2). Petitioner argues that the Board considered and relied upon information that has
not been provided to Petitioner’s appellate counsel.

On January 15, 2019, Petitioner’s appellate counsel provided Petitioner with an
“Authorization and request to release information pursuant to Public Officer’s Law

Section 87, Executive Law Section 259-k and 9 NYCRR 8000.5.” (“FOIL

Request”)(Exhibit B).
Upon information and belief, the FOIL request was received by the Senior Parole
Officer or Parole Officer in Charge at Green Haven Correctional Facility. (Exhibit R).

The following information was requested. (Exhibit R).
(1) The Inmate’s most recent Inmate Status Report; and
( 2)

Any and all previous Inmate Status Reports; and

(3)

The Inmate’s most recent Parole Board Report; and

(4)

Any and all previous Parole Board Reports ; and

(5)

Any records showing the programs attended and/or completed by
the Inmate and information related thereto; and

(6 )

Any previous Parole Board decisions and/or transcriptions of any
previous parole hearings regarding this Inmate on the instant
offense ; and

(7) Inmate’ s disciplinary record; and
(8)

NYS Board of Parole Interview History; and

(9)

All letters of support for the inmate including, but not limited to
letters from inmates’ family and friends, letters of employment,
letters from any drug treatment programs ; and

(10) Any and all community opposition to the Inmate’s release; and
(11) Inmate’s record of work assignments in any of the facilities in which he
has been held; and
( 12 ) A copy of transcripts from any of the Inmate’ s sentencing
proceedings; and
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(13) A copy of any of the Inmate’s pre-sentence reports ; and
(14) A copy of any statements by the District Attorney’s office, the
Defendant’s attorney, and/or Judge from the instant offense (Emphasis
added); and

(15) A copy of the results of any Risk & Needs assessment performed on the
Inmate, including but not limited to any COMPAS Risk & Needs
assessment.
( 16 ) Copies of each of the commissioners’ notes for the commissioners
that conducted the parole release hearing ; and

(17) If the inmate has been incarcerated as a result of a finding of a
Revocation of parole after Final Parole Revocation Hearing, then provide
a copy of the following documents related to the violation of parole.
a. Notice of Violation; and
b. Violation of Release Report; and
c. Case Summary; and
d. Parolee’s Criminal History; and
e. Certificate of Release to Parole Supervision; and
f. Any Special Conditions of release to Parole Supervision; and
g. Any Accusatory Instruments or documents relating to any new
arrest that may have involved the Parolee; and
h. Notice of Decision; and
i. Decision from the Final Parole Revocation Hearing.

The Board provided only some of the requested documents. The items
highlighted in bold above were not provided.

With regard to past hearing transcripts, the Board provided some, but not all, of
the requested documents. This was Petitioner’s seventh substantive appearance

before the Board. (Exhibit A at p. 2, 1. 16-18). Despite Petitioner’s request for each of
these transcripts, the Board provided only the instant transcript, the December 18, 2012
appearance, and the February 8, 2011 appearance. The Board failed to provide the

remaining transcripts.

Petitioner asserts that the Board’s failure to provide information violates 9
NYCRR 8000.5(c)(1)(iii), which, in pertinent part, states the following.
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9 NYCRR 8000.5(c) Access to case records maintained by the Division of

Parole.
(1 ) An inmate, a releasee or counsel for either may have
access to information contained in the parole case
record:
(iii) prior to the timely perfecting of an
administrative appeal of a final decision of the
board. (Emphasis added).

If the Board had any information for its review in denying the Petitioner’s parole

release, then the Petitioner’s attorney on the administrative appeal should be entitled to
that information to prepare the appeal. 9 NYCRR 8000.5(c)(1)(iii) and 9 NYCRR
8006.1(e) and (f). Denial of access to such information is a denial of procedural and

substantive due process under the state and federal constitutions and the statutes and
regulations governing parole release. Denial of access to such information is a violation

of the confrontation clause and the right to effective assistance of counsel as set forth in

the state and federal constitutions and the statutes and regulations governing parole
release.
A similar kind of deprivation was held unconstitutional in the parole revocation
context in Mayfield v. Evans , 93 A.D.3d 98, 938 N.Y.S.2d 290 (1st Dept. 2012). In

Mayfield , the parolee was found to be a Category I violator, and a hold of 18 months
was imposed by Administrative Law Judge Porter. (Mayfield , 93 A.D.3d at 100, 938
N. Y.S.2d at 293). The then-existing parole regulations required that one or more

commissioners review the transcript and the documents regarding the parole violation to
determine the actual number of months to be given as a hold for the parole violator.
( Mayfield , 93 A.D.3d at 101, 938 N. Y.S.2d at 293). The parolee was not permitted to
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have any access to the commissioners making the final decision. The parolee was not
aware of what documents were reviewed by the commissioners. The Appellate Division

held that this final decision-making power, by the commissioners, through this process,
was unconstitutional. (Mayfield, 93 A.D. at 107-108, 938 N. Y.S.2d at 298).

The underpinnings of the Court of Appeals decision in Mayfield are that a parolee
should be given access to the information being considered by the decision maker, and
the ability to argue for release based upon that information. It is an absolute
prerequisite that, in order to be able to make any argument to the deciding authority, the
petitioner must be aware of what information is being considered by the deciding

authority. In Mayfield , both of these fundamental rights were violated.

Even if, for the sake of this argument, it were to be assumed that the Board’s
procedure with regard to determining an inmate’s suitability for release on parole was

constitutional, then the application of this procedure, in the instant Petitioner’s case,
violated the substantive and procedural Due Process, the confrontation and the

effective representation protections afforded by the New York State and Federal

constitutions and the statutes and regulations governing parole release.
The Petitioner has been denied access to necessary information to contest his
denial of parole by the Board.
Another Appellate Division decision presents a situation that informs as to how
the deprivation of required and necessary information is an error of law in the instant
Petitioner’s case. The Panel is constrained to consider only the accurate record in

rendering its Decision. Matter of John Lewis v. Travis , 9 A.D.3d 800; 780 N.Y.S. 2d 243
(3rd Dept. July, 2004). It is a sine qua non that the only way that the Petitioner can
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evaluate the accuracy of any information considered by the Board is for Petitioner to
review the information first. Denying Petitioner’s attorney on his administrative appeal

access to information that was available to the Board eliminates this possibility.
In Matter of John Lewis v. Travis, 9 A.D.3d 800; 780 N.Y.S.2d 243 (3rd Dept. July,

2004), the Third Department reversed the Decision of the Board when it was learned
that the Panel relied upon incorrect information.
By analogy, from Mayfield and Lewis , the same result is required here. The

Petitioner has been denied necessary access to information that was available to the
Board. The denial of the Petitioner’s access to required and necessary materials
available to the Parole Board is, therefore, a denial of his constitutionally guaranteed
rights.

The Board’s failure to provide the required and necessary information set forth
above, pursuant to its own regulations, is arbitrary, capricious and otherwise unlawful.
The denial of Petitioner’s access to required and necessary materials available to the
Board is, therefore, a denial of his rights under the New York State and Federal
constitutions and the statutes and regulations governing parole release.
Accordingly, Petitioner should be released, or, in the alternative, a de novo
hearing is required.
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AS FOR A CHALLENGE (Board’s Determination Was Unlawful, Arbitrary and
Capricious Because the Board considered the Petitioner’s Prior Juvenile and Youthful
Offender History)

Petitioner herein argues that, in accordance with 9 NYCRR 8006.3(a)(1), the
proceeding and/or determination was in violation of lawful procedure, was affected by

an error of law, was arbitrary and capricious or was otherwise unlawful. Specifically, it
is submitted that the Board violated the statute by over-emphasizing Petitioner’s prior

record and considering things that should not have been considered, in particular, the

Petitioner’s Juvenile and Youthful Offender adjudications.
While the Board may be permitted to take a Petitioner’s prior record into account,
there are limits. The Third Department reversed a denial of parole release for an inmate
serving a sentence of 25 years to life for murder in the second degree because the

Board incorrectly referred to the inmate’s prior youthful offender adjudication as a felony
conviction. Hughes v. New York State Division of Parole , 21 A.D.3d 1176, 800

N.Y.S.2d 854 (3rd Dept. 2005). “Inasmuch as a youthful offender adjudication ‘is not a
judgment of conviction for a crime or any other offense’ we reverse the judgment and

order a new hearing.” Hughes , 21 A .D.3d at 1176, 800 N.Y.S.2d at 854-855 (citations
omitted).
In the instant case, the Board looked back at the Petitioner’s Juvenile

adjudication. (Exhibit A at p. 18, 1. 3-11).

In light of the Third Department’s decision in Hughes the Board violated the clear

mandate of the statute by basing its decision on the past conduct that it should not have
considered.
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Accordingly, at a minimum, a new hearing should be ordered. In the alternative

the Petitioner should be released to parole.

AS FOR A CHALLENGE (Board Acted Arbitrarily, Capriciously and Unlawfully and in
Error of Law by Relying Upon Incorrect Information )

Petitioner herein argues that the proceeding and/or determination was in violation
of lawful procedure, was affected by an error of law, was arbitrary and capricious or was

otherwise unlawful, and the Board’s determination relied on erroneous information as
shown in the record of the proceeding, in accordance with Regulation 8006.3(a)(1) &
(2). Specifically, Petitioner argues that the Board considered and relied upon

information in the Petitioner’s file that is incorrect.
The COMPAS Risk Assessment performed on Petitioner on August 27, 2018,
and made available to the Board for Petitioner’s November 28, 2018 appearance,

indicates that Petitioner received a score of “Low” in the category of prison misconduct.
(Exhibit E).

However, during the November 28, 2018 interview, the Board erroneously stated,

“You have in your COMPAS , probably the highest COMPAS score you have is under
prison misconduct, you have a 10.” (Exhibit A at p. 8, 1. 1-3). The Board then
exacerbates this error when it states, “I think I mentioned before, your prison

misconduct is a score of 10.” (Exhibit A at p. 14, 1. 6-7).
The Board’s statements are clearly erroneous, as they are without any basis
whatsoever and are directly refuted by the documentary evidence before the Board -
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namely the COMPAS Assessment. In fact, the Board’s statements are indefensible.

It’s as if the Board were reviewing some document other than this petitioner’s COMPAS,

which clearly indicates a prison misconduct score of “low.” (Contrast Exhibit E at p.1,
Prison Misconduct with Exhibit A at p. 8, 1. 1-3 and at p. 14, 1. 6-7).
The only correct reference to Petitioner’s disciplinary history made by the Board
was the statement that, “[Petitioner’s] last disciplinary was in May of 2015..." (Exhibit A
at p. 14, 1. 22).

The Board inappropriately relied on the above erroneous information in rendering
its decision to deny parole release. Specifically, the Board stated, in its decision, “Your
high COMPAS prison misconduct scores reflect your poor compliance with DOCCS

rules.” (Exhibit A at p. 20, I. 17-18). Again, this statement is in direct conflict with the
results of the COMPAS assessment performed on this petitioner.

The Panel is constrained to consider only the accurate record in rendering its
Decision. In Matter of John Lewis v. Travis , 9 A.D.3d 800; 780 N.Y.S.2d 243 (3rd Dept.
July 2004), the Third Department reversed the Decision of the Board when it was

learned that the Panel relied upon incorrect information. The Board incorrectly referred

+

to the petitioner’s conviction as murder in the first degree, when, in fact, the petitioner

was convicted of murder in the second degree. Lewis , 9 A.D.3d at 801, 780 N.Y.S.2d at
245.

Further support for this restriction on the Board comes from the legal requirement
that the Board is not permitted to rely on erroneous information such as the fact of the
petitioner’s first conviction. Quartararo v. NYS Division of Parole , 08/18/1995 NYLJ, 23,

(col. 1)(Exhibit U at p. 1).
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The Supreme Court, New York County held the following.
Respondent has demonstrated the petitioner will never
receive a fair parole hearing. On three separate occasions
respondent has shown that it cannot or will not follow its own
regulations, statutory mandate, or the lawful order of this court.
Each of petitioner's hearings has been tainted by improper and
prejudicial information, including that which I specifically ordered
respondent not to consider. The Board has failed to support any of
its determinations by adequate evidence, has misconstrued its role,
power and duty, prejudged each of petitioner’s parole applications,
and applied the wrong legal standard. For all of these reasons, and
because it is difficult if not impossible to believe that each of the
nineteen State Parole Commissioners has not formed an opinion or
been tainted in some way by the improprieties in this case, the only
appropriate relief is an order directing release. Quartararo ,
08/18/1995 NYLJ, 23, (col. 1)(Exhibit U at p. 7).

The Appellate Division, First Department then affirmed the Supreme Court, New
York County’s decision, except for the remedy. Quartararo v. NYS Division of Parole ,

224 A.D.2d 266, 266, 637 N. Y.S.2d 721, 721-722 (1st Dept., 1996). The Appellate
Division, First Department held the following.
The record supports the conclusion of the IAS Court that, in
denying petitioner's application for parole after the February and
March hearings, respondent improperly considered factors outside
the scope of Executive Law 259-i and in violation of a prior court
order. However, while we share the IAS Court's concern over
respondent's failure, after three attempts, to provide petitioner with
a fair hearing, the proper remedy is to remand the matter for a de
novo hearing before a different panel rather than to order
petitioner's release on parole ( see, Matter of King v. New York
State Division of Parole , 83 N.Y.2d 788, 610 N.Y.S.2d 954, 632
N.E.2d 1277 (1994)). Quartararo, 224 A.D.2d at 266, 637 N. Y.S.2d
at 721-722.
The same result is required here. The Panel relied upon incorrect information in
reaching its decision. Accordingly, the Petitioner should be release to parole
supervision, or, at a minimum a de novo hearing is required.
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AS FOR A CHALLENGE (Board Acted Arbitrarily, Capriciously and Unlawfully and in
Error of Law by Relying Upon Information That has not Been Provided to Petitioner’s
Appellate Counsel - Namely, Information Formerly Contained Within the Inmate Status

Report (“ ISR”) Which Has Been Deleted From the Parole Board Report (“ PBR”))

Petitioner herein argues that the proceeding and/or determination was in violation
of lawful procedure, was affected by an error of law, was arbitrary and capricious or was

otherwise unlawful, and the Board’s determination relied on erroneous information as

shown in the record of the proceeding, in accordance with Regulation 8006.3(a)(1) &
(2). Petitioner argues that the Board considered and relied upon information that has
not been provided to Petitioner’s appellate counsel, namely information formerly

contained within the Inmate Status Report (“ISR”) which has been deleted from the
Parole Board Report (“PBR”).

Petitioner asserts that the Board’ s failure to provide information that was formerly
provided with the ISR but is not contained within the PBR, violates 9 NYCRR

8000.5(c)(1)(iii), which, in pertinent part, states the following.
9 NYCRR 8000.5(c) Access to case records maintained by the Division of

Parole.
( 1 ) An inmate , a releasee or counsel for either may have
access to information contained in the parole case
record:

(iii) prior to the timely perfecting of an
administrative appeal of a final decision of the
board . (Emphasis added).
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As argued elsewhere in this appeal, Petitioner properly requested, pursuant to
FOIL, to be provided with the most recent Inmate Status Report and any previous

Inmate Status Reports. (Exhibit R). In an attempt to comply with this request, the

Board provided a single-page “Parole Board Report.” (Exhibit I). The Parole Board
Report has replaced the Inmate Status Report. However, upon information and belief,

the Parole Board Report contains multiple pages. The source of this belief is the Parole

Board Report itself, which indicates that Petitioner’s criminal history is attached, by the
indication, “See attached PBCHR.” (Exhibit I). The Board failed to supply any of the
remaining pages of the Parole Board Report.

The information contained within an Inmate Status Report, which has been
deliberately deleted from a Parole Board Report, is extremely pertinent to Petitioner’s
arguments on appeal. The specific information contained within the Inmate Status

Report (Exhibit V), as compared to the Parole Board Report (Exhibit I), is set forth

below. The attached Inmate Status Report (Exhibit V) is provided for comparison
purposes only. It has been redacted to maintain anonymity. The items set forth in bold
print in the Parole Board Report section are not provided in the Parole Board Report ,

but are provided in the Inmate Status Report.

Information contained within an
Inmate Status Report:

•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•

•

Information contained within a
Parole Board Report:

•
•

Name
Received Date
CMC not indicated
Date of Birth
DIN identifier
NYSID identifier
FBI identifier not indicated
Parole Eligibility Date
Conditional Release Date

•

•
•
•
•
•
•
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•
•
•

Maximum Expiration Date
Post Release Supervision
PVNT status
Time on Parole
Time Served
Crimes
o Felony Class
o Sentence Type
o Plea or Verdict
o Aggregate Sentence
Guideline Range
EEC
o If denied, reasons in file?
Special Programs
o Program Violations
Mandatory SPP
Comments
Official Statements
Certificate of Relief
(Addressed in comments)
Co-Defendant information
Details regarding the present
offense
Inmate’s Statement
Criminal Record
o Indicating “See attached”
o Criminal History attached
Institutional Adjustment
Disciplinary Record
Proposed Residence
Proposed Employment
Inmate’s Plans

•
•
•

•

•
•

•
•

•
•

•
•
•
•

•
•
•

•
•
•

•
•

•
•

Supervision needs
Special Conditions
Recommended
• Documentation Status
• Service Applications
(Exhibit V)(Emphasis added).

•
•

Maximum Expiration Date
Post Release Supervision
PVNT status
Time on Parole
Time Served
Crimes of Commitment
o Felony Class
o Sentence type
o Plea or Verdict
o Aggregate Sentence
Guideline Range omitted
EEC
o Reasons for denial omitted
Special Programs omitted
o Violations omitted
SPP omitted
Comments omitted
Official Statements
Certificate of Relief
Sentencing Minutes
Co-Defendant information
Details regarding the present
offense
Offender Statement
Criminal History
o Indicating “See attached”
o Criminal History omitted
Institutional Adjustment omitted
Disciplinary record omitted
Proposed Residence
Proposed Employment
Inmate’s Plans omitted
Supervision Needs omitted
Special Conditions omitted
Documentation Status omitted
Service Applications omitted
(Exhibit l)(Emphasis added).

Many of the pertinent items contained within the Inmate Status Report have been

purposefully omitted from the Parole Board Report. A direct effect of these deliberate
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omissions is the elimination of extremely relevant information that appellate counsel can

use to show that Petitioner has completed necessary programs, maintained a
reasonable disciplinary record, and made a reasonable institutional adjustment.
Additionally, the Petitioner cannot raise arguments with regard to exceeding the relevant
guideline range, as the range is no longer provided by the PBR.

If the Board had any information for its review in denying the Petitioner’s parole

release, then the Petitioner’s attorney on the administrative appeal should be entitled to
that information to prepare the appeal. 9 NYCRR 8000.5(c)(1)(iii) and 9 NYCRR
8006.1(e) and (f). Denial of access to such information is a denial of procedural and

substantive due process under the state and federal constitutions and the statutes and
regulations governing parole release. Denial of access to such information is a violation
of the confrontation clause and the right to effective assistance of counsel as set forth in

the state and federal constitutions and the statutes and regulations governing parole
release.

A similar kind of deprivation was held unconstitutional in the parole revocation
context in Mayfield v. Evans , 93 A.D.3d 98, 938 N.Y.S.2d 290 (1st Dept. 2012). In
Mayfield , the parolee was found to be a Category I violator, and a hold of 18 months

was imposed by Administrative Law Judge Porter. (Mayfield , 93 A.D.3d at 100, 938
N. Y.S.2d at 293). The then-existing parole regulations required that one or more
commissioners review the transcript and the documents regarding the parole violation to

determine the actual number of months to be given as a hold for the parole violator.
(Mayfield , 93 A.D.3d at 101, 938 N.Y.S.2d at 293). The parolee was not permitted to

have any access to the commissioners making the final decision. The parolee was not
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aware of what documents were reviewed by the commissioners. The Appellate Division
held that this final decision-making power, by the commissioners, through this process,
was unconstitutional. (Mayfield, 93 A.D. at 107-108, 938 N.Y.S.2d at 298).

The underpinnings of the First Department’s decision in Mayfield are that a
parolee should be given access to the information being considered by the decision

maker, and the ability to argue for release based upon that information. It is an absolute
prerequisite that, in order to be able to make any argument to the deciding authority, the
petitioner must be aware of what information is being considered by the deciding

authority. In Mayfield , both of these fundamental rights were violated.

Even if, for the sake of this argument, it were to be assumed that the Board’ s
procedure with regard to determining an inmate’s suitability for release on parole was

constitutional, then the application of this procedure, in the instant Petitioner’s case,

violated the substantive and procedural Due Process, confrontation and effective
representation protections afforded by the New York State and Federal constitutions

and the statutes and regulations governing parole release.
The Petitioner has been denied access to necessary and relevant information to
contest his denial of parole by the Board.

Another Appellate Division decision presents a situation that informs as to how
the deprivation of required and necessary information is an error of law in the instant
Petitioner’s case.

The Panel is constrained to consider only the accurate record in rendering its
Decision. Matter of John Lewis v. Travis , 9 A.D.3d 800; 780 N.Y.S. 2d 243 (3rd Dept.
July, 2004). It is a sine qua non that the only way that the Petitioner can evaluate the
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accuracy of any information considered by the Board is for Petitioner to review the
information first. Denying Petitioner’s attorney on his administrative appeal access to
information that was available to the Board eliminates this possibility.
In Matter of John Lewis v. Travis , 9 A.D.3d 800; 780 N. Y.S.2d 243 (3rd Dept. July,
2004), the Third Department reversed the Decision of the Board when it was learned

that the Panel relied upon incorrect information.
By analogy, from Mayfield and Lewis , the same result is required here. The

Petitioner has been denied access to necessary and relevant information that was
available to the Board.

The denial of the Petitioner’s access to required and necessary materials
available to the Parole Board is, therefore, a denial of his guaranteed rights under the
New York State and Federal constitutions and the statutes and regulations governing
parole release.

The Board’s failure to provide the required and necessary information set forth
above, pursuant to its own regulations, is arbitrary, capricious and otherwise unlawful.
Accordingly, Petitioner should be released, or, in the alternative, a de novo
hearing is required.

AS FOR A CHALLENGE (Board Failed to Consider all Relevant Statutory Criteria )

Petitioner herein argues that, in accordance with 9 NYCRR 8006.3(a)(1) and (3),
the proceeding and/or determination was in violation of lawful procedure, was affected
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by an error of law, was arbitrary and capricious or was otherwise unlawful. Specifically,

Petitioner argues that the Board failed to consider all relevant statutory criteria.

Section 259-i(2)(c)(A ) of the Executive Law requires that the reviewing Board
consider certain factors when making a release determination:

...(c)(A) Discretionary release on parole shall not be granted
merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of
duties while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable
probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at
liberty without violating the law, and that his release is not
incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so deprecate
the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for law. In
making the parole release decision, the procedures adopted
pursuant to subdivision four of section two hundred fifty-ninec of this article shall require that the following be considered:
(i) the institutional record including program goals and
accomplishments, academic achievements , vocational
education, training or work assignments, therapy and
interactions with staff and inmates; (ii) performance, if any, as
a participant in a temporary release program ; (iii ) release plans
including community resources , employment, education and
training and support services available to the inmate; (iv) any
deportation order issued by the federal government against
the inmate while in the custody of the department and any
recommendation regarding deportation made by the
commissioner of the department pursuant to section one
hundred forty-seven of the correction law; (v) any statement
made to the board by the crime victim or the victim's
representative , where the crime victim is deceased or is
mentally or physically incapacitated; ( vi) the length of the
determinate sentence to which the inmate would be subject
had he or she received a sentence pursuant to section 70.70 or
section 70.71 of the penal law for a felony defined in article two
hundred twenty or article two hundred twenty- one of the penal
law; (vii) the seriousness of the offense with due consideration
to the type of sentence, length of sentence and
recommendations of the sentencing court, the district
attorney, the attorney for the inmate, the presentence
probation report as well as consideration of any mitigating and
aggravating factors, and activities following arrest prior to
confinement; and (viii) prior criminal record, including the
nature and pattern of offenses, adjustment to any previous
probation or parole supervision and institutional confinement.
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The board shall provide toll free telephone access for crime victims.
In the case of an oral statement made in accordance with
subdivision one of section 440.50 of the criminal procedure law, the
parole board member shall present a written report of the statement
to the parole board. A crime victim's representative shall mean the
crime victim's closest surviving relative, the committee or guardian
of such person, or the legal representative of any such person.
Such statement submitted by the victim or victim's representative
may include information concerning threatening or intimidating
conduct toward the victim, the victim's representative, or the
victim's family, made by the person sentenced and occurring after
the sentencing. Such information may include, but need not be
limited to, the threatening or intimidating conduct of any other
person who or which is directed by the person sentenced.
(Emphasis added).

While the statute does not require that the Board discuss each element, ( See, In
the Matter of Davis v. NYS Div. of Parole , 114 A .D.2d 412, 494 N.Y.S.2d 136 (1985);
Matter of Mackall v. New York State Bd. of Parole , 91 A.D.2d 1023, 458 N.Y.S.2d 251;
People exrel. Herbert v. NYS Bd . of Parole , 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1983);
In the Matter of King v. New York State Division of Parole , 83 N.Y.2d 788, 610 N. Y.S.2d

954, 632 N.E.2d 1277 (1994); Matter of Rentz v. Herbert , 615 N. Y.S.2d 178 (A.D. 4
Dept. 1994)), it is submitted that there must be some serious examination of the

elements either during the hearing or in the decision itself.
The Board is required to conduct the analysis required by the statute and
regulations. Matter of Darryl King v. NYS Division of Parole , 83 N.Y.2d 788, 791, 610

N.Y.S.2d 954, 955 (1994); Matter of Chester Almonor v . NYS Division of Parole , 16

Misc.3d 1126(A), 847 N.Y.S.2d 900, 2007 WL 2379719 (Sup. Ct. NY Cty.,
2007)(Unreported disposition) (Exhibit N at p. 4); Matter of Chester Almonor v. NYS

Division of Parole , 15 Misc.3d 1116(A ), 839 N.Y.S.2d 431, 2007 WL 1018211 (Sup. Ct.

NY Cty., 2007)(Unreported disposition) (Exhibit O at p. 3); Matter of Jean Coaxum v.
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NYS Division of Parole, 14 Misc.3d 661, 672, 827 N.Y.S.2d 489, 498 (Sup. Ct. Bronx
Cty., 2006). Indeed, many times over the past 25 years, the Parole Board disregarded
filing requirements and suffered the resulting judicial invalidation of its actions. See

People v. Johnson, 180 A.D.2d 914, 580 N.Y.S.2d 957 (3rd Dept. 1992); Kinard v. New
York , 173 Misc.2d 760, 662 N. Y.S.2d 346 (Sup. Ct. Erie Co. 1997); Matter of Jones v.
Smith , 120 Misc.2d 445, 466 N.Y.S.2d 175 (Sup. Ct. Wyoming Co. 1983) affd. 64

N.Y.2d 1003, 662 N. Y.S.2d 50 (1985).

The Fourth Department dealt with what constitutes serious examination of the
statute’s requirements in Matter of Cummings , 45 A .D.2d 222, 224, 357 N.Y.S.2d 260,

263 (4th Dept. 1974).

We come now to the central question involved in this
proceeding: must the State Board of Parole give its reasons when
parole is denied to a prisoner who appears before it? We hold that
due process considerations as well as the public policy of this State
require that a meaningful statement of reasons be furnished to
every applicant who has been denied parole release in the exercise
of discretion delegated to the Board of Parole.
“As stated by another court of this state, this relator, by all indications, appears

suited for parole and yet the parole board has given petitioner no guidance as to what is
expected of him to qualify for parole thereby giving no considerations to the

rehabilitative objectives of modern penology.” People ex rel. Bermudez v. Kuhlmann,
87 Misc.2d 975, 977, 386 N.Y.S.2d 772, 774 (Cty. Ct. Dutchess Cty., 1976) citing ,
People ex rel. Schaurerv . Smith , 81 Misc.2d 1039, 1042-1043, 367 N.Y.S.2d 707, 710711 (Cty. Ct. Wyoming Cty., 1975).

The Fourth Department addressed this particular issue in Matter of Daniel

Johnson v. NYS Board of Parole , 65 A.D.3d 838, 884 N.Y.S.2d 545 (4th Dept. 2009). In
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Johnson “the only reason for the Parole Board’s denial of parole that is discernable [sic]
from the perfunctory reference to ‘[t]he violence associated with this terrible crime’ is
that the determination was based solely upon the seriousness of the crime.” 65 A.D.3d
838, 884 N.Y.S.2d at 547. The Fourth Department held that this language was

conclusory and ordered a new hearing. 65 A.D.3d 838, 884 N.Y.S.2d at 547.

In the instant Petitioner’s case, the Board failed to give proper and adequate
review and consideration of the statutory criteria.
The decision from Petitioner’s November 28, 2018, reappearance before the

Board states the following.
parole denied. Hold 24 months. Next
appearance, November 2020.

Following a personal interview, record review and
deliberation , this Panel finds that your release to supervision is
incompatible with the public safety and welfare. Therefore, parole
at this time is denied.

We have considered your COMPAS Risk and Needs
Assessment . Significant weight has been placed on your poor
behavior during this term . You have incurred more than twenty
disciplinary reports.
Your high COMPAS prison misconduct score reflects
your poor compliance with DOCCS rules . You are serving a
sentence with a twenty- five- year minimum. Records show that
your most recent report occurred in May of 2015.
We have reviewed your programming, Case Plan, and
discussed your learning difficulties. Also discussed were the
Sentencing Minutes, and include comments made in later
letters from the district attorney.
Your family support and limited criminal record are
reflected in low COMPAS scores, which are positive .
Documents you submitted are generally from past parole
interviews, but were considered.
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Most compelling this Panel finds you need to maintain a
clean disciplinary record, over a significant period of time. We also
encourage you to develop and document appropriate release plans.
To grant your release at this time would so deprecate the
seriousness of your offense as to undermine respect for the law.
Parole is therefore denied. (Exhibit A at p. 20-21)(Emphasis
added).
While the Panel did make some minor mention of some of the items required by
the statute, a reading of the transcript supports the conclusion that such mention was
simply “lip service” and designed solely for the meeting of the statutory requirements.
(Exhibit A); People ex rel. Schaurer , 81 Misc.2d at 1042-1043, 367 N.Y.S.2d at 710-

711.

Other courts have found Board decisions that are exactly like or virtually similar
to the decision given above, to be defective. Matter of Huntley , 77 A.D.3d 945, 910

N.Y.S.2d 112 (2nd Dept. 2010); Matter of Johnson v. Parole , 65 A.D.3d 838, 884
N.Y.S.2d 545 (4th Dept. 2009 ); Matter ofFriedgood v. Parole , 22 A.D.3d 950, 802
N.Y.S.2d 268 (3rd Dept. 2005); Matter of Rios v. Parole , 15 Misc.3d 1107(A ), 836
N.Y.S.2d 503 (Sup. Crt. Kings County, 2007), 2007 NY Slip Op 50529 (Unreported

Decision)(Exhibit W). New hearings were ordered in these cases.
The transcript supports the conclusion that the Panel had no intention of
releasing this Petitioner. (Exhibit A). The Panel did not properly consider the statutory
items.

The Panel should have more thoroughly considered and examined Petitioner’s
realistic and credible objective to make a living and to lead a law-abiding lifestyle.
(Exhibit A ). It was not enough to simply make the brief inquiry they did. There should
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have been a more thorough examination of this goal and of the manner by which the
Petitioner could change his life and accomplish his goals. This Panel did none of that.
(Exhibit A ).

It is submitted that when the statute calls for the Board to consider certain
criteria, that it must actually do so, and not simply “note” or acknowledge some aspects

of the Petitioner’s history. (Exhibit A at p. 20-21). In this case, there was nothing
presented by the Petitioner that was contrary to the statute; nothing presented under the
statute which justifies his continued incarceration. This Panel failed to adequately and

properly consider this Petitioner’s institutional record, and to seriously consider his

release plans. (Exhibit A ).
The Petitioner therefore should be released to parole, or in the alternative be
given a de novo hearing.

AS FOR A CHALLENGE ( Board’s Determination was Unlawful, Arbitrary and

Capricious Because the Board Acted as a Sentencing Judge)

Petitioner herein argues that, in accordance with 9 NYCRR Part 8006.3(a)(1), the
proceeding and/or determination was in violation of lawful procedure, was affected by

an error of law, was arbitrary and capricious or was otherwise unlawful. Specifically, it

is submitted that the Board acted as a sentencing judge in its decision to deny parole
release to Petitioner because the decision was premised on the notion of what the
Board felt should be an appropriate punishment for the crime.
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It has been noted that the parole release decision is not intended to be premised
upon the notion of retribution or punishment. Such considerations are reserved for the
sentencing court. Matter of Cummings v. Regan , 45 A.D.2d 222, 357 N.Y.S.2d 260 ( 4th

Dept. 1974), dismissed on ground of mootness , 36 N.Y.2d 969 (1975). Instead, the
parole release decision primarily focuses on the rehabilitative goal. Cummings , 45

A.D.2d at 224, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 263.
“The establishment of penal policy is not the role of the Parole Board or of any

other administrative agency.” Matter of King v. New York State Division of Parole , 190

A.D.2d 423, 432, 598 N.Y.S.2d 245, 251 (1st Dept., 1993), Aff’d , 83 N.Y.2d 788, 610
N. Y.S.2d 954 (1994). “The torturous and difficult decisions involved in determining the
appropriate penalty to be imposed for the commission of a particular crime is

fundamentally a function which belongs in the hands of elected officials to be performed

in open and considered debate. It is the province of the legislative process, except

insofar as the legislature has entrusted, within certain parameters, the imposition of

individual sentences to the judiciary.” Matter of King , 190 A.D.2d at 432, 598 N.Y.S.2d
at 251. “The role of the Parole Board is not to resentence petitioner according to the

personal opinions of its members as to the appropriate penalty for [the instant offense],

but to determine whether, as of this moment, given all the relevant statutory factors, [the
petitioner] should be released.” Matter of King, 190 A.D.2d at 432, 598 N.Y.S.2d at 251.

In above cited cases the Courts found that in reviewing and discussing the crime
itself and the circumstances surrounding that offense and then making a decision as to
whether or not to release the petitioner, the Board had acted improperly by applying
their own sense of what is “just” to the case.
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In the instant case, the Panel exceeded the scope of their duty. Rather than
simply consider the nature of the crime, in light of other indicia, the Panel considered
the crime and its circumstances to the exclusion of all else, or at least to a level which

minimized the value of the other statutory factors. The Board then applied its own
sense of “justice” and in effect acted as a sentencing judge and re-sentenced the

Petitioner.
The instant case is virtually identical to the cases noted above. The transcript
here shows clearly that this Panel felt compelled to re-sentence this Petitioner simply

because of the crime itself and not for any other reason. (Exhibit A at p. 20-21).
The case of Chan v. Travis, sets forth the role of the sentencing judge and the

Parole Board. The Albany County Supreme Court stated the following:
In this State's penological and sentencing scheme as
applicable to this petitioner, the sentencing judge sets the
minimum and maximum terms of an indeterminate sentence
within legislative prescriptions, presumptively reflecting the
judge's view of what minimally and maximally would satisfy
the ends of justice given all the facts and circumstances of the
particular case . Generally, the minimum aspect of an
indeterminate sentence reflects an acceptable period of
confinement and punishment in the event of satisfactory
rehabilitation, while the maximum imposed represents the lawful
period of incarceration absent satisfactory institutional adjustment
and rehabilitative effort. The Board of Parole then determines
the maximum expiration or release date of an indeterminate
sentence within that judicially imposed range and in
accordance with statutory guidelines for the exercise of its
quasi- judicial function. In a proper implementation of this
sentencing model, the Board assumes and performs the
additional and essential function of "leveling" sentences and
correcting unjustified sentencing disparity across or from
within jurisdictions , an aspect of sentencing that the appellate
courts have generally declined to superintend. NYLJ 3/27/2003, p.
28, col. 4.(Exhibit Q at p. 3)(Emphasis added).
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It is submitted that in the instant Petitioner’s case, the Board acted unlawfully by
imposing its own sense of what is an appropriate sentence for Petitioner and that

Petitioner’s institutional and documented record does not support a finding that his
release is incompatible with the welfare of society. (Exhibit A at p. 20-21).

This Panel acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner by acting as a sentencing
judge in holding this Petitioner over for another 24 months, the maximum permitted, for

the seventh consecutive time. (Exhibit L).
Accordingly, the Petitioner should be released to parole or in the alternative, a
new and expedited hearing should be granted.

AS FOR A CHALLENGE (Board's Determination to Not Reconsider Parole Release Again
for 24 Months is Excessive)

Petitioner herein argues that, in accordance with 9 NYCRR Part 8006.3(a)(1) &
(3), the proceeding and/or determination was in violation of lawful procedure, was

affected by an error of law, was arbitrary and capricious or was otherwise unlawful.
Specifically, it is submitted that the Board’s decision to deny parole release to the

Petitioner and to hold the Petitioner for an additional 24 months until his next hearing is
excessive. The Board’s decision was premised on the notion of what the Board felt
should be an appropriate punishment for the crime.
The Board's determination to hold the Petitioner for 24 additional months until his
next hearing is excessive. Given Petitioner’ s institutional adjustment, it is unclear what,

if anything, he can do between now and the next hearing date which will alter or change
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the minds of the Commissioners. (See, People ex rel. Schauerv. Smith , 81 Misc.2d
1039, 367 N. Y.S.2d 707 (Cty. Ct. Wyoming Cty., 1975); People ex rel. Davis v. McDlay

(Sup. Ct. Richmond County, NYLJ January 10, 1977, p. 15, col. 2).
The case of Chan v. Travis is instructive on this issue. (Exhibit Q). The Albany
County Supreme Court stated:

To hold that the Board's statement of the factors and
reasons for denial in this case is sufficient would condone the
Board's apparent disregard of the rehabilitative component of the
indeterminate sentencing and parole statutes. "Noting" an inmate's
positive institutional adjustment or achievements in the written
decision is not tantamount to considering them in a fair, reasoned
and individualized manner. Indeed, such cursory treatment turns on
its head the reformative or rehabilitative principle underlying an
indeterminate sentence. This can only serve as a gross disincentive
to inmates contrary to the overall ends of a sound penal and
corrections policy. NYLJ 02/27/2003, p. 28, col. 4. (Exhibit Q at p.
5).
The Instant case is very similar to Chan. Nothing in this Petitioner’s record
indicates that he cannot and will not remain at liberty without violating the law.

Therefore, the hold of 24 months before the next hearing is excessive and a sentence.
It is not a valid consideration of the Petitioner’s potential for release and reintegration
into the community.

Accordingly, the Petitioner should be immediately released, or in the alternative a

de novo hearing should be ordered.
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AS FOR A CHALLENGE (Board Acted by an Error of Law, was Arbitrary and
Capricious or was Otherwise Unlawful in that the Commissioners on the Board and the
Board Acted in a Manner that Demonstrated Bias Toward the Petitioner from the Previous
Experience of the Board Members)

The Petitioner herein argues that, in accordance with Regulation 8006.3(a)(1),

the proceeding and/or determination was in violation of lawful procedure, was affected
by an error of law, was arbitrary and capricious or was otherwise unlawful. Specifically,

this Panel improperly showed and acted with bias toward the Petitioner in that the

Commissioners on the Board and the Board acted in a manner that demonstrated the
previous experience of the Board members.

The Petitioner has now had seven parole hearings. (Exhibit L). Each time,

Petitioner was denied parole and held for the maximum time allowed - 24 months. The
most recent parole hearing was held on November 28, 2018. (Exhibit A).

At this parole hearing, Commissioners W. Smith, E. Berliner, and E. Alexander
were present. (Exhibit A at p. 1).
On August 14, 2018, the New York Daily News ran an article entitled, “Hard Time

for Parole.” (See Exhibit K). This article was based upon, inter alia, a report by
Release Aging People in Prison and the Parole Preparation Project. In the article,
Commissioner Smith is described as “a politically connected member of the board since
1996, [who] consistently denies parole to prisoners convicted of violent crimes and is

prone to losing his temper and mocking inmates seeking to convince him they’ve turned

their lives around.” (Exhibit K at p. 1).
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Perhaps even more alarming, “the report charges that [Commissioner Smith] has
lasted so long due to his ‘repeated contributions to powerful legislators.’” (Exhibit K at
p. 2). The article alleges the following.

[Commissioner Smith] has donated $20,000 to state and
national campaigns since 2000, records show. That includes
$16,997 to state Sen. Patrick Gallivan over the past eight years.
Gallivan (R-Erie County), a former parole board member, is
chairman of the state’s Crime and Correction Committee.
‘Accepting campaign contributions in exchange for political
appointments, and then attempting to influence the decisions of
those appointees who serve on an independent administrative
agency is the definition of corruption’ the report says. (Exhibit K at

P - 2-3).

The biased and prejudicial pattern of behavior by the Board is obvious to this
writer. It takes a conscious and deliberate act of the will to ignore the existence of, or

rationalize the effect of such bias and prejudice of the Commissioners and the Board.

In the opinion of this writer, I do not see that any Board member can ignore the
existence of his prior experience or rationalize that experience away.
Accordingly, the Petitioner should be entitled to immediate release, or in the

alternative to a de novo hearing, before new commissioners who do not have previous
law enforcement experience.
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AS FOR A CHALLENGE (Board’s Determination was Unlawful, Arbitrary and
Capricious Because the Board Effectively Imposed a Sentence by Mandating
Reconsideration of Parole Status at 24 Months )

Petitioner herein argues that, in accordance with 9 NYCRR Part 8006.3(a)(1), the
proceeding and/or determination was in violation of lawful procedure, was affected by
an error of law, was arbitrary and capricious or was otherwise unlawful. Specifically, it

is submitted that the Board’s determination to not consider Petitioner’s parole status
again until the expiration of 24 months (the maximum permitted by statute) was arbitrary

and capricious or otherwise unlawful because the decision was premised on the notion

of what the Board felt should be an appropriate punishment for the crime.
As noted above, the Petitioner has done what he can legitimately be expected to
accomplish to prepare himself for life on the outside. It is submitted that absent a clear

indication that he has somehow failed or that he can do more between this hearing and
the next hearing, the Board does not have a valid basis for denying reconsideration
again until the maximum permitted under the statute (24 months). (See, People ex rel.

Schauer v. Smith , 81 Misc.2d 1039, 367 N.Y.S.2d 707 (Cty. Ct. Wyoming Cty., 1975);
People ex rel. Davis v. McDlay ( Sup. Ct. Richmond County, NYLJ January 10, 1977, p.

15, col. 2 )).

Indeed, the statute itself mandates that the Board’s decision be stated in clear
and unequivocal terms as to why they are denying parole and the same requirement
applies to the decision to not consider parole again for the maximum period of time. To
permit the undocumented decision to hold someone until 24 months before his next

review is the very embodiment of what it means to be arbitrary and capricious, and it
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violates the statute. Further, to permit such unsupported decision-making by the Board
is tantamount to the Board acting as a sentencing judge. The statute, regulations and

case law do not permit such action. (See argument and case law cited elsewhere in this
appeal).

A case from Clinton County Supreme Court is similar to the issue in Petitioner’s
case. Rooks v. New York State Division of Parole (Sup. Ct. Clinton Cty.)(NYLJ

12/11/2000, p.38, col. 6)(Exhibit X). In Rooks an inmate was on parole from a Murder
1st conviction and was revoked for missing an appointment. He had been on parole for
14 years. At a subsequent parole release hearing, parole was denied and he was held

for the maximum period. The decision was based upon the nature of the crime, his
continued denial of the crime, and that his release therefore would not be in the best
interest of the Community. The Court however ruled that nothing in the Petitioner’s 14
years of being on parole, nor his institutional record, demonstrated any indication that

he would not remain at liberty without violating the law. The Court then overruled the
Board’s determination and ordered Petitioner’s immediate release.

The instant case is very similar to Rooks. Nothing in this Petitioner’s record
indicates that he cannot and will not remain at liberty without violating the law.
Therefore, Petitioner should be immediately released, or in the alternative, a de

novo hearing should be ordered.
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AS FOR A CHALLENGE (Board’s Determination Was Unlawful, Arbitrary and
Capricious Because the Board Abdicated Their Discretion

^

Petitioner herein argues that, in accordance with 9 NYCRR 8006.3(a)(1) and the
applicable statutory law, the proceeding and/or determination was in violation of lawful
procedure, was affected by an error of law, was arbitrary and capricious or was

otherwise unlawful. Specifically, it is submitted that the Board’s determination to deny
parole release to the Petitioner was unlawful because the decision was made based

upon a political agenda, and because the Panel did not exercise ITS discretion.

Executive Law Section 259(b)(4) states: “The members of the state board of
parole shall not hold any other public office; nor shall they, at any time of their
appointment nor during their incumbency, serve as a representative of any political
party on an executive committee or other governing body thereof, nor as an executive

officer or employee of any political committee, organization or association.”

A fair interpretation of the purpose of this section is to remove, as much as
possible, the members of the board from political influence. That is, to permit - nay, to

demand - them to exercise their fair and honest judgment based upon the facts and the
Petitioner before them. Their duty is to evaluate the Petitioner and not to respond to
political influence, or pressures from the outside. To do anything less does not serve
the greater public good in rehabilitation, or comply with due process.

But as almost everyone is aware, such is not the case in our current Parole
system. When the Governor “gets tough” on drugs or violence, he sends a message

directly to the members of the Parole Board and those members respond by abdicating
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their duty in evaluating the Petitioner before them. Instead, the Governor’s “get tough”
policy translates into a policy of no early release for certain classes of Petitioners. To

them, there is an acknowledgement that no matter what achievements the Petitioner

has made, no matter what the recommendations, no matter how many certificates or the
like the Petitioner may have earned, the Petitioner will not be released. Such abdication

of their duty is directly at odds with the stated purpose behind the section of law noted
above - to remove them from such pressures and to give each, and every Petitioner, a

fair hearing without any pretext.
The case of Matter of Chan v. Travis , is on point. 2/27/2003 NYLJ p. 28, col. 4
(Sup. Ct., Albany County)(Exhibit Q). In that case the Panel refused to release a

Petitioner who had been convicted of a violent felony. The decision in that case was
brief and cited the seriousness of the offense, a prior record, and note was made of
petitioner’s positive institutional adjustment. The Court, in reviewing that Decision,

noted several important aspects that apply to this point.
First, in Chan , the Court noted that the Board does indeed have broad discretion.
(Exhibit Q at p. 3-4). “It is true that when deciding a parole release application, the

Board must consider the circumstances, nature and seriousness of an inmate’s

offense( s).” (Exhibit Q at p. 4). “But the Board’s reliance on the ' seriousness of the

offense’ is not beyond all review.” (Exhibit Q at p. 4). “By legislative prescription,
petitioner’s crimes and indeterminate sentences are parole eligible and it is
unquestionably the duty of the Board to give fair consideration to each of the applicable
statutory factors to every person who comes before it.” (Exhibit Q at p. 4). “There is no

exception for persons convicted of manslaughter, gang related crimes or other violent
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crimes.” (Exhibit Q at p. 4). “To deny parole exclusively on the seriousness of
petitioner’s crimes there must have been some significantly aggravating or egregious

circumstances surrounding the commission of the particular crime.” (Exhibit Q at p. 4).
Turning to the Petitioner’s case, neither the Petitioner’s record, nor the Board’s

written decision reveal a factual basis indicating the presence of “significantly
aggravating or egregious circumstances” surrounding petitioner’s commission of the

instant crimes.
Second, the Court notes: “Overarching this case are the contentions underlying
petitioner’s fourth cause of action - that the Parole Board is following an Executive

policy initiative to curtail parole for all violent felons.” (Exhibit Q at p. 5). The Albany
County Supreme Court stated:

In addition, the petition and accompanying exhibits outline a
series of statements. .. attributed to various Executive branch policy
makers and officials. Without regard to the truth of such statements
and the innuendo therein, at the very least the making of them
raises a concern that such sentiments have invaded parole release
decision making. For example, Governor Pataki “told the parole
board to carefully review inmates with violent histories, and . . .
don’t worry about prison capacity. ..” (Attributed to K. Lapp, Director
of Criminal Justice, in M. Pfeiffer, “Parole Denials Negate Crime
Drop”. Poughkeepsie Journal, November 6, 2000, at 1A). (Exhibit Q
at p. 6).

The Albany County Supreme Court went on to state:
Against the backdrop of these statements, it is not seriously
disputed that since 1995 there has been a sharp decline in parole
release for violent felonies, from about fifty one percent in 1994 to
thirty percent in 1997 [and even less today]. ... Clearly, something
has changed at the Parole Board. From this record there is an
undeniable inference that the Board has “gotten the message”; that
violent offenders are not being granted release before the
expiration of their maximum terms; and the Board is de facto
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implementing Executive policy by curtailing parole for violent felons.

(Exhibit Q at p. 6).

From the record in Petitioner’s case, “there is an undeniable inference that the
Board has ‘gotten the message’ that violent offenders are not being granted release
before the expiration of their maximum terms; and the Board is de facto implementing

Executive policy by curtailing parole for violent felons.” (Exhibit Q at p. 6).
It is clear from a reading of this transcript that this Panel had its “marching
orders.” That is, they have been directed to hold individuals convicted of this type of
crime for the maximum time permissible - despite any evidence to the contrary such as

institutional behavior and adjustment, letters of recommendation, release plans, and
completing college courses and programs while incarcerated, in other words, the
statutory criteria. Indeed, recent news articles have been filled with instances in which

the Board was merely following orders. The Board simply allowed the political agenda
to be substituted for their statutory authority to exercise discretion. There was no real
attempt at discerning this Petitioner’s possible release and reintegration into society. It

was simply a sham, a mere parroting of the statutory language. The simple and clear
fact is that this Panel could not, under the current political climate, release this inmate
no matter what the circumstances.

It is submitted that by following this direction, this policy, the Panel has abdicated
its authority, its discretion, which it is not permitted to do. The statute is clear that the

Panel is to exercise discretion, not simply follow a political agenda.
The Petitioner should be released on parole or, in the alternative granted a de

novo hearing.
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CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE , for all the foregoing reasons, Petitioner respectfully requests that
the relief sought be granted or that such other and different relief as the Board may
deem just and proper be granted.

Dated:

Poughkeepsie, New York
April 11, 2019
Respectfully submitted,

_

—

GLENN R. BRUNO, EStl
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellant
11 Market Street, Suite 221
Poughkeepsie, NY 12601
845-454-2385
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